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"HELP, I'VE FALLEN AND CAN'T GET UP!"
NEW YORK'S APPLICATION OF THE
SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST
DAVID JAKUBOWITZ*
INTRODUCTION
Tort law seeks to compensate plaintiffs who are injured by acts
or omissions of defendants.' Technically, duty, breach, causation
and damages are the necessary elements in any negligence
claim.2 In other words, plaintiffs are required to prove, by a
* J.D. Candidate, St. John's University School of Law, June 2004. The author, first and
foremost, thanks his parents and sister for their unconditional love and support through
many years of schooling, in addition to his grandparents, aunts, uncles, brother-in-law,
niece, nephews, and cousins for their love and caring as well. Another thank you to
Professor Daniel Kramer for his instruction, thoughts and guidance (and grade) in writing
this Note and without whom this paper either would not have been written or would not
have been written well. In light of that, the author cannot forget to thank the Journal of
Legal Commentary staff members, editorial board, and especially the frontliner, for their
hard work. Lastly, and most importantly, I dedicate this Note to the memory of my
beloved, sweet, caring, and (I can't forget) utterly adorable grandfather, Ernest Lefkowitz,
who passed away this past year and sadly will not see me graduate but will be at my
graduation in spirit. I miss you - friends should treat each other the way you treated
strangers.
1 See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 52 (1983) (instructing the jury in a tort case to
find the fair amount that will compensate plaintiff for damages sustained from
defendant's conduct); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 553 F. Supp. 340, 342 (E.D. Penn.
1982) (quoting In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 506 F.Supp. 762, 793-94
(E.D.N.Y. 1980)) (stating tort liability principles properly seek to impose liability on
wrongdoers whose acts or omissions caused injury); Nancy L. Manzer, 1986 Tort Reform
Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limitations on Joint and
Several Liability, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 628, 651 (1988) (highlighting that tort law
traditionally limited compensation to those injured by acts or omissions of another).
2 See, e.g., Denman v. Coppola General Contracting Corp., 683 N.Y.S.2d 617, 618
(App. Div. 1998) (setting forth elements of the plaintiffs cause of action); Martha
Chamallas, Questioning The Use of Race-Specific And Gender-Specific Economic Data In
Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 73 (1994) (setting
out the four elements of a negligence claim); Richard A. Nagareda, Turning From Tort To
Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 908 (1996) (describing the four elements of
negligence as "familiar" in common law).
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preponderance of the evidence, 3 that a defendant's breach of a
duty caused injury to the plaintiff.4
The most debated and confusing area of this seemingly simple
body of law is causation.5 The reason is, that when broken down
philosophically, "the cause of an event is the sum of all the
antecedents." 6 Hence, because any one event is the sum of an
infinite number of causes how can one, or a few of those
antecedents, get singled out as the cause? 7
The answer is that if the law does not seek to assign blame,
then people would not be responsible for their actions and "no
tortfeasor would be regarded as the cause of any damage."8
Therefore, in order to hold defendants liable the courts have
come up with various measures by which to identify legal
causation. 9
3 See, e.g., Glastetter v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., 252 F.3d 986, 991 (8th Cir.
2001) (stating preponderance of the evidence standard and more likely than not standard
are identical and they are both used to assess tort liability); Murray v. United States, 215
F.3d 460, 464 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Hurley v. United States, 923 F.2d 1091, 1094 (4th
Cir. 1991)) (explaining negligence law requires plaintiff to prove by preponderance of
evidence defendant's breach of duty caused plaintiffs injury); American Optical Co. v.
Weidenhamer, 457 N.E.2d 181, 183 (Ind. 1983) (commenting that the plaintiff must prove
by preponderance of evidence that his injury resulted from a breach of duty owed to him).
4 See, e.g., Silvers v. Silvers, 999 P.2d 786, 793 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000) (stating what
the plaintiff must establish in any negligence case); Kuhn v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 876
S.W.2d 668, 672 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (explaining the four elements that the plaintiff must
establish to prevail in a negligence claim); Comer v. Tandy Corp., 367 S.E.2d 436, 437
(S.C. Ct. App. 1988) (announcing that negligence causes of action arises when the
defendant breaches a duty owed to plaintiff, proximately resulting in damage).
5 See Nola M. v. University of S. Cal., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 109 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(noting legal scholars continue to debate meaning of causation in tort law); Richard W.
Wright, Once More into the Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal Contribution, and the Extent of
Legal Responsibility, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1071, 1072 (2001) (stating "[flew issues in tort law
are more in need of clarification than those encompassed by the concepts of legal cause
and duty .. "); see also Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-In-Fact and the Scope of
Liability for Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941, 943 (2001) (suggesting tort law term of
"legal cause" is in need of re-evaluation due to its confusing nature).
6 Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause In Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 103, 104 (1911)
(expounding on John Stuart Mill, in his work on Logic, 9 Eng. Ed., 378-383).
7 See id. (summarizing John Stuart Mill as concluding "that we have no right to single
out one antecedent and call that the cause"); see also Stewart v. Federated Dep't Stores,
Inc., 662 A.2d 753, 758 (Conn. 1995) (theorizing that "cause in fact is limitless; 'but for'
the creation of this world, no crime or injury would ever have occurred"); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a (1965) (instructing "substantial" can be used in two
senses and that "substantial" is not to be used "in the so-called 'philosophic sense,' which
includes every one of the great number of events without which any happening would not
have occurred."). See generally Fleming James Jr. & Roger F. Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE
L. J. 761, 761 (1951) (pointing out that the potential scope of liability is vast because "the
causes of causes are infinite").
8 See Smith, supra note 6, at 104.
9 Some of these procedures are the "but for" test, the foreseeability test, the
superceding or intervening cause test, the substantial factor test, public policy arguments,
2004] NYS APPLICATION OF THE SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST 595
Traditionally, courts understood legal causation to be both
factuallO and proximate.11 However, evolution in the law has
confused and muddled the factual and proximate elements of
negligence actions by adopting the vague terminology of
"substantial factor."12 Consequently, sympathetic plaintiffs have
been able to recover money damages from defendants whose
negligence did not cause the plaintiffs injuries.13
The focus of this note is to explain why New York must
abandon the use of the "substantial factor" test for determining
causation. Part I is a synopsis of New York proximate causation
principles. At the end of Part I, the author offers five reasons,
which form a motif throughout this paper, on why the substantial
factor test must be discarded. Part II identifies the origin of the
substantial factor test, and the context of how substantial factor
and questions as to proximity of distance, time and space. See Dale v. E. R. Knapp &
Sons, Inc., 433 S.W.2d 880, 883-84 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968) (relaying numerous formulae
which "have been suggested for determining' causation); see also Menne v. Celotex Corp.,
861 F.2d 1453, 1458 (10th Cir. 1988) (showing some states, such as Nebraska, incorporate
more than one test of causation); Point Prods. A.G. v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 215 F.
Supp. 2d 336, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (explaining how New York courts can sometimes use
substantial factor test in place of "but for" test).
10 Factual causation, cause-in-fact, necessary condition, and sine qua non all express
the concept of "but for" causation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26, cmt. b
(Tentative Draft No. 2, March 25, 2002); see also PROSSER & KEETON, LAW OF TORTS § 41
(5th ed. 1984). An action is a cause of a result if but for the act the result would not have
occurred; on the other hand, an action is not a cause of a result if the result would have
occurred without the action. For an in depth explanation and an enlightening five-step
breakdown of "but for" causation see David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in
Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1768-75 (1997).
11 See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that what is meant by proximate cause "is, that because of
convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to
trace a series of events beyond a certain point"); see also Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting
Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666, 670 (N.Y. 1980) (stating that proximate cause is an elusive concept
stemming "from policy considerations that serve to place manageable limits upon the
liability that flows from negligent conduct"). See generally WILLIAM L. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 (4th ed. 1971) (describing proximate cause as a
term of art signifying the point where legal responsibility attaches for the harm done to
another).
12 See Vern R. Walker, Direct Inference In The Lost Chance Cases: Factfinding
Constraints Under Minimal Fairness To Parties, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 247, 247 (1994)
(indicating that the substantial factor jury instruction is vague and lacks guidance); see
also Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 605, 615-16 (Ariz. 1984) (rejecting
the application of the substantial factor doctrine to jury instructions); William V.
Dorsaneo, III, Judges, Juries, and Reviewing Courts, 53 SMU L. REV. 1497, 1527 (2000)
(describing the substantial factor component of the causation analysis as vague).
13 See infra Part V; see also Cavlin v. N.Y. Med. Group, 730 N.Y.S.2d 337, 338 (App.
Div. 2001) (allowing recovery where a doctor's negligence was incidental to the patient's
death); Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 357 N.Y.S.2d 508, 511 (App. Div. 1974), aff'd, 337
N.E.2d 128 (N.Y. 1975); Birkbeck v. Cent. Brooklyn Med. Group, P.C., 2001 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 368, at *14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 22, 2001) (utilizing, inappropriately, the so-called
"loss of chance to survive" theory to compensate plaintiff).
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is appropriately used. Part III puts New York's adoption of
substantial factor into a historical perspective by identifying
important New York case law. When analyzing those decisions, I
discuss how the cases probably would have been decided if the
defendant's negligence were required to be a condition precedent
to the harm incurred by the plaintiff. I further detail how the
New York Court of Appeals incorrectly applied the principles
imbedded in the Restatement (Second), the authority cited by the
Court for using substantial factor. Part IV questions the
ambiguity in the meaning of the terminology "substantial factor;"
while Part V, through the illustrative use of medical malpractice
cases, demonstrates the injustice of solely using the substantial
factor test for determining causation. Lastly, in Part VI, I
propose a cause-in-fact jury instruction in which I advocate a
"but for" rule. It is recommended that this jury instruction be
used as an addition to all the other proximate cause tests, like
foreseeability, intervening or superceding causes, public policy,
and all other arguments that serve to limit liability. In this
manner, it is important to note that the focus of this paper is to
address the inadequacy of the terminology "substantial factor"
when used as an element of causation and that this paper does
not address the other elements of proximate cause just herein
mentioned.
I. NEW YORK LAW
A. The State of the "But-For" Test
Over the past 100 years, New York's negligence causation
principles have gone under a progressive change. New York
utilized the "but-for" test, at least in part,14 from the turn of the
20th century15 through the 1990's.16 However, at the turn of the
14 See, e.g., Sullivan v. B & A Constr., Inc., 120 N.E.2d 694, 696 (N.Y. 1954)
(indicating that while a defendant's negligence is a condition precedent to a plaintiffs
injury it is not necessarily a proximate cause); Robbins v. Frohlich, 106 N.E.2d 65, 66
(N.Y. 1952) (maintaining that "but for" causation is indispensable in compensation
claims); Brown v. New York State Training Sch., 32 N.E.2d 783, 783 (N.Y. 1941) (noting
that injury must flow "therefrom as a natural consequence" of the plaintiffs work in
compensation claims).
15 See Berry v. Utica Belt Line St. Ry. Co., 73 N.E. 970, 971 (N.Y. 1905) (utilizing "but
for" causation in determining plaintiffs contributory negligence); Moylan v. Second Ave.
R.R. Co., 128 N.Y. 583, 584 (1891) (noting that to determine proximate cause a jury was
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21st century, it is questionable whether the sine qua non concept
still plays a critical role in causation principles.17
1. Is "But-For" obsolete?
In 1980, the Court of Appeals when presented with causation
issues did not address "but-for" causation, but, instead adopted
the substantial factor test18 and stated that the plaintiffs burden
is "to show that the defendant's [negligence] was a substantial
causative factor in the sequence of events that led to [the
plaintiffs] injury."19 Furthermore, both the Second and Third
Departments, beginning in the early 1990's have denounced the
use of the "but-for" test.20 The Third Department proclaimed that
the "but-for" test is "inconsistent with accepted substantive rules
of tort law" 21 and held that the concept of proximate causation is
one and the same as the term "substantial factor."22
However, while the current trend in New York on causation
asked to also consider "but for" causation); Lilly v. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R.
Co., 14 N.E. 503, 506 (N.Y. 1887) (equating proximate cause with "but for" causation).
16 See Herbert H. Post & Co. v. Sidney Bitterman, Inc., 639 N.Y.S.2d 329, 336 (App.
Div. 1996) (indicating that to establish negligence there must exist a "but for" causal
connection between a plaintiffs loss and a defendant's actions); Minelli v. Good Samaritan
Hosp., 624 N.Y.S.2d 452, 452 (App. Div. 1995) (utilizing "but for" causation in
determining severity of the plaintiffs damages); Scott v. Keener, 588 N.Y.S.2d 946, 947
(App. Div. 1992) (using "but for" causation to establish negligence).
17 See N.Y. PJI 2:70 (3d ed. 2003) (mentioning only "substantial factor" and not "but
for" causation); see also Hersman v. Hadley, 651 N.Y.S.2d 754, 757 (App. Div. 1997)
(rejecting "but for" causation in relation to jury instructions); Benaquista v. Mun. Hous.
Auth., 622 N.Y.S.2d 129, 131 (App. Div.1995) (utilizing only "substantial factor" causation
with respect to jury instructions).
18 See Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 407 N.E.2d 451, 458 (N.Y. 1980) (using
language of "substantial causative factor"); see also Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp.,
414 N.E.2d 666, 670 (N.Y. 1980) (providing that in order to prove a prima facie case
plaintiff must show that the defendant's negligence was a substantial cause); Sewar v.
Gagliardi Bros. Serv., 411 N.E.2d 786, 791 (N.Y. 1980) (utilizing substantial factor
causation to validate a finding of negligence).
19 Nallan, 407 N.E.2d at 458.
20 See Bisceglia v. Int'l Bus. Machs., 732 N.Y.S.2d 92, 94 (App. Div. 2001) (rejecting
"but-for" analysis as a basis for liability); see also Hersman, 651 N.Y.S.2d at 757
(discarding the use of "but for" causation); Benaquista, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 131 (rejecting the
use of "but for" causation in jury instructions).
21 Penovich v. Schoeck, 676 N.Y.S.2d 253, 254 (App. Div. 1998).
22 See Martonick v. Pudiak, 727 N.Y.S.2d 829, 831, (App. Div. 2001) (holding that
"there can be no question" that the terms substantial factor and proximate cause "are
synonymous"). See generally Rotheberg v. Reichelt, 742 N.Y.S.2d 150, 152-53 (App. Div.
2002) (using substantial factor language in the jury instruction for proximate cause);
Palmateer v. Whitcavitch, 681 N.Y.S.2d 883, 883-84 (App. Div. 1998) (discussing jury
confusion as to the meaning of "substantial factor" in the jury instructions for proximate
cause).
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issues is to focus solely on substantial factor, 23 "but-for"
causation still plays a role. The First and Fourth departments
still incorporate "but-for" rationale into causation.24 Moreover, all
four Appellate Departments still used the "but-for" test into the
1990's.25 Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain the exact state of
the condition precedent requirement in New York case law.
2. "But-For" In Legal Malpractice
There are two areas of law in New York where the "but-for"
test is fundamental. 26 The "but-for" test is always employed in
determining whether a certain occurrence is covered or excluded
from insurance coverage. 27 Secondly, courts never fail to require
23 See N.Y. PJI § 2:70 (3d ed. 2003) (focusing on "substantial factor"); see also e.g.,
Howard v. Parsons' Child and Family Ctr., 761 N.Y.S.2d 381, 383-84 (App. Div. 2003)
(using "substantial cause" and not "but for" test in determining whether or not defendant
was negligent); Stewart v. Avasso, 754 N.Y.S.2d 551, 551 (App. Div. 2003) (holding that
plaintiff did not prove a prima facie case because plaintiff failed to prove that defendant's
negligence was "substantial cause of the events which produced the injury").
24 See Murray-Davis v. Rapid Armored Corp., 752 N.Y.S.2d 37, 37-38 (App. Div.
2002) (stating that "In this matter, 'but for' defendant's allegedly illegally parked truck,
plaintiff would not have had to make lane change which purportedly precipitated
accident"); see also Cantor Fitzgerald Assocs. L.P. v. Tradition N. Am., Inc., 749 N.Y.S.2d
249, 249 (App. Div. 2002) (asserting that the essential element of plaintiffs claim for
tortuous interference with a contract is that "breach of contract would not have occurred
but for the activities of the defendant"); Williams v. Majewski, 737 N.Y.S.2d 463, 464-65,
(App. Div. 2002) (using '"ut for" in applicability of relation back doctrine).
25 See Herbert H. Post & Co. v. Sidney Bitterman, Inc., 639 N.Y.S.2d 329, 336 (App.
Div. 1996) (using but for language, not substantial factor language); Minelli v. Good
Samaritan Hosp., 624 N.Y.S.2d 452, 452 (App. Div. 1995) (finding that lower court erred
by granting summary judgment because "the jury could have reasonably concluded that,
but for the defendants departures from good and acceptable medical practices, the
plaintiffs injuries would have been less severe than they were"); Scott v. Keener, 588
N.Y.S.2d 946, 957 (App. Div. 1992) (applying "but for" language in determination of
contributing cause to accident).
26 See Silva v. Utica First Ins. Co., 755 N.Y.S.2d 433, 434 (App. Div. 2003) (utilizing
the "but for" test in insurance coverage action); see also Loren E. Mulraine, The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals Student Project: A SURVEY OF RECENT CASE LAW:
Professional Responsibility: The Imminent Peril of Neglecting a Legal Matter, 33 How.
L.J. 411, 419 (1991) (enumerating "but for ' causation as an essential element in a legal
malpractice action in New York); Barry R. Temkin, Can Negligent Referral to Another
Attorney Constitute Legal Malpractice, 17 TOURo L. REV. 639, 643-44 (2001) (discussing
how in the context of legal malpractice occurring in litigation, element of causation has
been construed to require '"ut for" causation).
27 See Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., v. Creative Hous., 88 N.Y.2d 347, 353 (1996)
(applying the "but for" test as the appropriate test for the determination of insurance
coverage); Watkins Glen Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 732 N.Y.S.2d 70, 73
(App. Div. 2001) (employing the "but-for" test when looking at the nature of the
underlying conduct to determine whether the occurrence is covered or excluded from
insurance coverage); see also Marcus v. United States Casualty Co., 162 N.E. 571, 573
(N.Y. 1928) (asking whether the insurance policy covered a person who fell down an
elevator shaft).
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the plaintiff to prove "but-for" causation in legal malpractice. 28
This "but-for" requirement in legal malpractice, as opposed to
other areas of negligence law, creates an ironic inconsistency.
In legal negligence claims, the courts constantly require an
attorney's carelessness to be a condition precedent to the
plaintiffs harm;29 whereas, in other negligence areas the court
eases the plaintiffs burden by using the less demanding
requirement of substantial factor. 30 In order to eliminate this
discrepancy and afford all defendants the same protection that
attorneys afford themselves, New York needs to explicitly
reiterate the consistent use of the condition precedent
requirement and abandon the substantial factor test.31
B. Substantial Factor in New York
Before courts can sever a defendant's liability by either using
the foreseeability test,32 the superceding event test,33 or any
28 See, e.g., Britt v. Legal Aid Society, Inc., 741 N.E.2d 109, 112 (N.Y. 2000)
(requiring, in context of a criminal conviction as the underlying suit, "that the criminal
client bear the unique burden to plead and prove that the client's conviction was due to
the attorney's [negligent representation] and not due to some consequence of his guilt");
Vooth v. McEachen, 73 N.E. 488, 489 (N.Y. 1905) (holding, in a suit by a client against an
attorney for negligent collection of a claim, that the client bore the burden of proving that
"but-for" the attorney's negligence the claim would have been collected); Franklin v.
Winard, 606 N.Y.S.2d 162, 164 (App. Div. 1993) (using the "but-for" test in legal
malpractice case).
29 See, e.g., Epifano v Schwartz, 719 N.Y.S.2d 268, 269-70 (App. Div. 2001)
(establishing a prima facie case for legal malpractice requires "but for" causation); Rau v.
Borenkoff, 691 N.Y.S.2d 140, 141 (App. Div. 1999) (stating that "In order to establish the
elements of proximate cause and damages, a plaintiff must show that but for the
attorney's negligence, he or she would have prevailed on the underlying claim"); Raphael
v. Clune, 607 N.Y.S.2d 734, 735 (App. Div. 1994) (using "but for" language).
30 See Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872, 877 n.2 (Cal. 1991) (demonstrating that the
substantial factor test is less burdensome than the "but-for" test by noting that the
defendants insisted the jury instructions on proximate cause be the "but-for" test, while
plaintiffs requested the instructions be the substantial factor test); see also Garrett v.
Bryan Cave LLP, No. 98-6282, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 7339, at *1, 5, 10-13 (10th Cir.
Apr. 21, 2000) (emphasizing that the plaintiff asserted error in the trial court using the
"but-for" test and not the "more relaxed 'substantial factor' test"); Highland Ins. Co. v.
Nat'l. Union Fire Ins. Co., 27 F.3d 1027, 1031 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing, in the context of
finding a possible breach of fiduciary duty, Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc.,
974 F.2d 270, 284 (2d Cir. 1992), for the proposition that "the question is not whether the
plaintiff has shown but for causation, but whether the plaintiff has satisfied a less
demanding 'substantial factor' standard").
31 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 cmt. j (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002)
(abandoning the substantial factor test); see also John D. Rue, Returning To The Roots Of
The Bramble Bush: The "But For" Test Regains Primacy In Causal Analysis In The
American Law Institute's Proposed Restatement (Third) Of Torts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
2679, 2681-82 (2003) (discussing the resurrection of the "but for" doctrine while
repudiating the "substantial factor" test).
32 See Pinero v. Rite Aid of N.Y. Inc., 743 N.Y.S.2d 21, 22 (App. Div. 2002) (reiterating
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other test which cuts off liability, 34 the courts must first impugn
liability on the defendant. 35 Traditionally, this was accomplished
by requiring the defendant's conduct to be a condition precedent
to the plaintiffs harm;36 however, with the decreasing popularity
of the "but-for" test, the substantial factor test has been playing
this role.37
that forseeability is an "essential element of a negligence cause of action"); Gattner v.
Coliseum Exhibition Corp., 230 N.Y.S.2d 340, 342 (App. Div.1962) (applying the
foreseeability test); see also Amatulli v. Delhi Constr. Corp., 571 N.E.2d 645, 648-49 (N.Y.
1991) (announcing that "a manufacturer, who has designed and produced a safe product,
will not be liable to injuries resulting from substantial alterations or modifications of the
product by a third party which render the product defective or otherwise unsafe" because
foreseeability is "inapposite where a third party affirmatively abuses a product by
consciously bypassing built in safety features") (internal quotation marks omitted).
33 See Perez v. New York Telephone Co., 554 N.Y.S.2d 576, 578 (App. Div. 1990)
(noting "an intervening act is deemed a superceding cause of the injury so as to relieve
the defendants of liability if it is of such an extraordinary nature or so attenuates
defendants' negligence from the ultimate injury that responsibility may not reasonably be
attributed to the defendants"); see also Skibinski v. Salvation Army, 761 N.Y.S.2d 742,
743 (App. Div. 2003) (informing that "a plaintiffs own conduct may be a superceding
cause which severs the causal connection between defendant's negligence and the injury");
Dasilva v. A.J. Contracting Co., 694 N.Y.S.2d 353, 354 (App. Div. 1999) (arriving at the
conclusion that "The striking of the ladder by a pipe cut during the ongoing demolition
was not such an extraordinary event as to constitute a superceding cause and,
accordingly, it cannot be said that plaintiffs actions in cutting the pipe were the sole
proximate cause of his injuries").
34 See Pagan v. Goldberg, 382 N.Y.S.2d 549, 552 (App. Div.1976) (suggesting five tests
that can be used as guidelines, including tests of status, temporal duration, spatial
duration, foreseeability, and public policy); see also Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843,
848 (N.Y. 1984) (adopting the "zone of danger" test to determine proximate causation for
claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress); Belling v. Haugh's Pools, Ltd., 511
N.Y.S.2d 732, 733 (App. Div. 1987) (utilizing the "obvious danger" test to sever liability in
products liability case based on negligent failure to warn).
35 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965) (requiring first that an actor's
negligent conduct satisfy both "but-for" and substantial factor tests, then subsequently
allowing an actor to be relieved of liability by rule of law).
36 See supra notes 14-16, and accompanying text; compare Williams v. Steves Indus.,
Inc., 699 S.W.2d 570, 575 (Tex. 1985), with Transportation Insurance Co. v. Moriel, 879
S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994) (using phrase "without which no harm would have occurred" to
illustrate defendant's conduct as prior in time to resulting harm). But see DiPonzio v.
Riordan, 679 N.E. 2d 616 (N.Y. 1997) (pointing out that where harm was caused by an
occurrence that was not part of the risk or recognized hazard involved in the actor's
conduct, the actor is not liable even if the actor's conduct preceded the defendant's injury).
37 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872, 887 (Cal. 1991) (asserting that
substantial factor test "has been comparatively free of criticism and has even received
praise"); see also County of Westchester v. Town of Greenwich, 870 F. Supp. 496, 501
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 186 Conn. 370, 384 (Sup. Ct. 1982))
(praising 'substantial factor' test as reflective of inquiry fundamental to all proximate
cause questions); William Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CAL. L. REV. 369,
421 (1950) (declaring "As an instruction submitting the question of causation in fact to the
jury in intelligible form, it appears impossible to improve on the Restatement's
'substantial factor [test.]"').
No case has been found where the defendant's act could be called a
substantial factor when the event would have occurred without it; nor will
cases very often arise where it would not be such a factor when it was so
indispensable a cause that without it the result would not have followed.
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The proximate cause instruction, which is first given to New
York juries, provides that a defendant's negligence is the cause of
an injury if the negligence was a substantial factor in bringing
about the injury.38 Moreover, in order to make out "a prima facie
case, the plaintiff must generally show that the defendant's
negligence was a substantial cause of the events which produced
the injury."39
While the substantial factor test has some utility in that it
prevents insubstantial or insignificant causes from giving rise to
liability,40 the test must be discarded. 41 First, the substantial
Abbott Laboratories v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
38 See N.Y. PJI § 2:70 (3d ed. 2003); see also Rothberg v. Reichelt, 293 A.D.2d 948, 949
(App. Div. 2002) (ordering new trial due to Supreme Court's failure to charge that portion
of Pattern Jury Instructions which provides: "Whether the negligence of a particular
party was a substantial factor in causing an injury does not depend on the percentage of
fault that may be apportioned to that party"); Kalam v. K-Metal Fabrications, Inc., 286
A.D.2d 603, 604 (App. Div. 2001) (holding that it was not harmless error for trial court to
fail to charge jury with entirety of PJI 2:70).
39 Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666, 670 (N.Y. 1980).
40 See Culver v. Bennett, 588 A.2d 1094, 1099 (Del. 1991) (stating substantial factor
"proposes to deny liability for insubstantial contributions"); see also Greenleaf v. Garlock,
Inc., 174 F.3d 352, 361 (3d Cir. 1999) (recanting the district court's jury instruction that
"A substantial factor is a real actual factor even though the result may be unusual,
unforeseen, unforeseeable or unexpected but it is not an imaginary or fanciful factor
having no connection or only an insignificant connection with the injury"); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 433 cmt. a (1965) (commenting that "Some other event which is a
contributing factor in producing the harm may have such a predominant effect in bringing
it about as to make the effect of the actor's negligence insignificant and, therefore, to
prevent it from being a substantial factor").
41 The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 cmt. j (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25,
2002), in a search for uniformity, recommends the abolishment of the substantial factor
test and a return to traditional 'but-for' causation. Like New York, some states solely
apply the substantial factor test. See Derdiarian, 414 N.E.2d at 670; see also Mitchell v.
Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872 (Cal. 1991); Montalvo v. Lapez, 884 P.2d 345 (Haw. 1994);
Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Claywell, 736 S.W.2d 328, 330-31 (Ky. 1987); Sherk
v. Daisy-Heddon, 450 A.2d 615, 635 n.13 (Pa. 1982) (Larsen, J., dissenting). All the way
on the opposite side of the spectrum, some states hold that the use of the substantial
factor test in jury instructions is reversible error as a matter of law. See Culver, 588 A.2d
at 1099; see also McDowell v. Davis, 448 P.2d 869 (Ariz. 1968). The other states, which are
in between these extremes, form a rainbow in the plethora of methods employed to
determine causation.
Some states explicitly break causation into two elements: factual causation and legal
(proximate) causation. See, e.g., Stewart v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 662 A.2d 753, 758
(Conn. 1995); Skinner v. Square D Co., 516 N.W.2d 475, 479 (Mich. 1994). While most
states that fall into this category use the 'but-for' test to determine cause-in-fact, there
appears to be no consistency as to determining legal (proximate) causation (however, the
various terms used by different states may just be using different vocabulary to express
the same concept). For example, Alabama applies foreseeability to determine legal
(proximate) causation, see Hilliard v. Huntsville Elec. Util. Bd., 599 So. 2d 1108, 1111-12
(Ala. 1992); while Washington uses public policy arguments for legal (proximate)
causation. See Griffin v. West RS, Inc., 18 P.3d 558, 562 (Wash. 2001). On the other hand
Tennessee employs the substantial factor test, among other tests, to determine legal
(proximate) causation, see Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594, 598 n.1 (Tenn. 1993); see
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factor test is a source of confusion for jurors42 and lawyers
alike. 43  Second, the term "substantial" is ambiguous,44
also Bronson v. Hitchcock Clinic, 677 A.2d 665 (N.H. 1996). In addition, in South Carolina
foreseeability generally determines proximate cause; but, apparently a cause being
classified as a substantial factor could override foreseeability. See Thomas Sand Co. v.
Colonial Pipeline Co., 563 S.E.2d 109, 112-13 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002). Maryland, unlike most
other states that fall into this category, applies either the substantial factor test or the
'but-for' test to determine cause-in-fact, see Kassama v. Magat, 767 A.2d 348, 361 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2001); and uses fairness and social policy to establish legal cause. See
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lane, 656 A.2d 307, 315 (Md. 1995).
However, the unpredictability of the application of causation principles runs much
deeper as most states do not explicitly use the cause-in-fact/legal (proximate) cause
breakdown. For instance, Arkansas defines proximate cause by 'but-for' causation but
includes substantial factor language in the assessment of foreseeability. See State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Pharr, 808 S.W.2d 769, 771-72 (Ark. 1991). Louisiana, New Jersey
and South Dakota apply the 'but-for' test in normal negligence cases; but, apply the
substantial factor test in cases involving concurrent causes of harm. Compare Perkins v.
Entergy Corp., 782 So. 2d 606, 611-12 (La. 2001), and Camp v. Jiffy Lube No. 114, 706
A.2d 1193, 1195-96 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), with Leslie v. City of Bonesteel, 303
N.W.2d 117, 119-20 (S.D. 1981). Oklahoma generally requires that the plaintiff meet the
'but-for' test; but, in loss of chance to survive situations the proximate causation standard
is relaxed to the substantial factor test. See McKellips v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d
467 (Okla. 1987). Surprisingly, Illinois allows a plaintiff to choose from between the
substantial factor or 'but-for' test, see Thacker v. UNR Indus., Inc., 603 N.E.2d 449, 455
(Ill. 1992); while Minnesota and Wisconsin, which adopted the substantial factor test,
hold that adding the "but-for" test into jury instructions is not prejudicial error. Compare
Fehling v. Levitan, 382 N.W.2d 901 (Min. Ct. App. 1986), with Chapnitsky v. McClone,
122 N.W.2d 400, 406-07 (Wis. 1963).
Other states stick to the original application of the substantial factor test and hold that
the "but-for" test is applicable in all cases except those involving two independent torts,
either of which is sufficient in and of itself to cause the injury, in which instance the
substantial factor test is appropriate. See Vincent by Staton v. Fairbanks Mem'l Hosp.,
862 P.2d 847, 851-52 (Alaska 1993); Fussell v. St. Clair, 818 P.2d 295 (Idaho 1991);
Skinner, 516 N.W.2d at 479, 481 n.8; Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d
852, 860-63 (Mo. 1993); Young v. Flathead County, 757 P.2d 772, 777 (Mont. 1988);
Johnson v. Egtedar, 915 P.2d 271, 276 (Nev. 1996).
And yet still other states simply require that the plaintiff meet the 'but-for' test. Y.H.
Invs., Inc. v. Godales, 690 So. 2d 1273, 1279 (Fla. 1997) (Wells, J., dissenting); Bader v.
Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1218 (Ind. 2000); Johnson v. School Dist. of Millard, 573
N.W.2d 116, 120 (Neb. 1998); Skaling v. Aetna Inc. Co., 742 A.2d 282, 288 (R.I. 1999);
Banks v. Richmond, 348 S.E.2d 280, 282 (Va. 1986). Not to mention the other states that
apply the 'but-for' test as a part of the substantial factor test. See Gerst v. Marshall, 549
N.W.2d 810, 817 (Iowa 1996); Bettencourt v. Pride Well Serv., Inc., 735 P.2d 722, 726
(Wyo. 1987). And lastly, some states employ both but-for and substantial factor in
causation analysis. See Smith v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 749 P.2d 462 (Colo. Ct. App.
1987); Hallett v. Stone, 534 P.2d 2323, 240 (Kan. 1975); Webb v. Haas, 728 A.2d 1261,
1267 (Me. 1999); Cerullo v. Riverside Mall, Ltd., No. 96-0856D, 1998 Mass. Super. LEXIS
275, at *6 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Feb. 23, 1998); Beilke v. Coryell, 524 N.W.2d 607 (N.D. 1994);
Marathon Corp v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Tex. 2003); Alder v. Bayer Corp., 61 P.3d
1068, 1090 (Utah 2002); Sergent v. City of Charleston, 549 S.E.2d 311, 320 (W. Va. 2001).
42 See Reynolds v. Gonzalez, 798 A.2d 67, 78-80 (N.J. 2002) (remanding the case for a
new trial based on juror confusion with the terminology 'substantial factor'); see also
Roberts v. County of Westchester, 717 N.Y.S.2d 276, 277 (App. Div. 2000) (stating that "it
is clear that the jury was confused as to the meaning of the phrase 'substantial factor");
Kovit v. Estate of Haltums, 261 A.D.2d 442, 446 (App. Div. 1999) (Friedmann, J.,
dissenting) (proposing that juries appear to be reading "substantial factor" as a synonym
for percentage of fault, resulting in some peculiar verdicts); Palmateer v. Whitcavitch, 681
N.Y.S.2d 883, 884 (App. Div. 1998) (lamenting that the jury "continued to express
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meaningless,45 and imports an overly subjective standard into
proximate cause. 46 Third, the substantial factor test has been
misapplied in New York courts for over 20 years. 47 Fourth, the
confusion as to the meaning of the phrase 'substantial factor"'); Mayer v. Goldberg, 659
N.Y.S.2d 877, 878 (App. Div. 1997) (noting that jury, notwithstanding its conclusion that
defendant's negligence was not substantial factor, still apportioned liability at 50%,
rendering an award of $250,000).
43 See McDowell, 448 P.2d at 871 (observing that the use of "substantial" in the jury
instruction is "source of additional confusion injected into an already difficult area of
law"). See generally Prosser & Keeton, supra note 10, at Supp. pp. 44-45 (noting that the
substantial factor test is confusing).
44 See Dorsaneo, supra note 12 at 1530 (describing the substantial factor test as
"vague and opaque"); see also State v. Leroy, 653 A.2d 161, 168 (Conn. 1995) (noting that
the term "substantial" has been described as too "ambiguous" and "difficult" for a trial
court to define). See generally Culver, 588 A.2d at 1099 (deducing "that the term
substantial factor has a quantitative connotation").
45 See Wright, supra note 5 at 1132, n.29 (condemning the substantial factor
formulation because it "does not 'resolve' anything" but "rather merely restates, confuses,
and begs both the empirical issue of causal contribution and the normative issue of legal
responsibility"); see also Walker, supra note 12 at 301 (concluding that the substantial
factor test provides little guidance to fact finders). But see Simpson v. Sisters of Charity of
Providence, 588 P.2d 4, 21-22 (Ore. 1978) (rejecting defense counsel's contention that the
substantial factor jury instruction is "meaningless").
46 This subjective standard is more easily understood when the substantial factor test
is compared to but-for causation.
The but-for test calls for a rather definite mental or analytical operation -
asking whether the particular injuries probably still would have occurred had
the particular negligent conduct not been engaged in. But with the substantial
factor test, "we suspend our commitment to the analytical approach and use a
term "substantial factor," that incorporates no particular mental operation but
appeals forthrightly to instinct."
Robertson, supra note 10 at 1179. See Walker, supra note 12 at 307 n.3, in which the
author notes that the but-for test has been criticized as an arbitrary but absolute hurdle
when compared to the more flexible substantial factor test; see also Conklin v. Hannoch
Weisman, 678 A.2d 1060, 1072-73 (N.J. 1996), which states that the substantial factor
test allows the jury to account for intervening causes without being constrained by the
strict causal chain required by the but-for test.
47 While it is not often the case where a court misinterprets law for such a lengthy
amount of time, mistakes of long duration have occurred. For instance, in Hicks v. United
States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966), the Fourth Circuit dealt with a wrongful death
medical malpractice case where the decedent's death was allegedly due to the failure of
the defendant to diagnose a condition. See id. at 628. The court stated that "[i]f there was
any substantial possibility of survival and the defendant has destroyed it, he is
answerable." See id. at 632. Some courts interpreted this "substantial possibility"
language to mean that where a plaintiff has less than an even chance of surviving (below
50%) and someone's negligence further diminishes that chance then the plaintiff could
nonetheless recover full damages even though, more likely than not, the plaintiff would
not have survived. Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1287-88 (Pa. 1978), interpreted
Hicks as permitting "the issue to go to the jury upon a less than normal threshold of
proof." Furthermore, O'Brien v. Stover, 443 F.2d 1013, 1018 (8th Cir. 1971), relied on
Hicks when affirming a plaintiffs verdict in a case where the plaintiffs own doctor
testified the chance of plaintiff dying, at the time of the defendant's negligence, was 70%.
See generally Perrochet, Smith & Colella, Lost Chance Recovery And The Folly Of
Expanding Medical Malpractice Liability, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 615, n.31 (1992), which
cites over twenty courts interpreting Hicks so as to allow a loss of chance of survival
recovery when the plaintiff, more likely than not, was not going to survive.
That interpretation of Hicks was a mistake, as the substantial possibility language in
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substantial factor test can work injustice on defendants. 48 Lastly,
an issue that I do not directly address in this Note, which has
been the subject of scholarly criticism, is that the substantial
factor test confuses causal contribution with the preponderance
of evidence standard of proof and normative issues on the extent
of legal responsibility. 49
II. ORIGIN OF THE SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST
Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co.,50 was the
first case to use the substantial factor test.51 The plaintiff alleged
that in August, 1918, the defendant's locomotive's engines
started a fire in a bog close to the west side of the plaintiffs
Hicks was dicta. See id. Moreover, Hicks did not involve a loss of chance to survive action
as the plaintiff was, more likely than not, going to survive but for the negligence of the
doctor. See Hicks, 368 F.2d at 632. The most damaging evidence showing the fallacy of
that interpretation is that even the Fourth Circuit, the authors of the Hicks opinion,
acknowledged in Murray v. United, 215 F.3d 460, 464-65 (4th Cir. 2000), that courts
adopted conflicting interpretations of the relevant Hicks language.
Consequently, courts were misinterpreting Hicks for at least 20 years because of the
ambiguity in the "substantial possibility" language. See id. at 464. The correct
interpretation of Hicks is that "substantial possibility" means the plaintiff's burden of
proof is more probable than not. See id. at 464-65. It further connotes that a plaintiff is
not required to prove to a certainty that had the defendant not been negligent the patient
would have lived; rather, the plaintiff must prove that the decedent had a greater than
50% chance of living "in the absence of the defendant's negligence." See id. If it is possible
for so many courts to misread the language of "substantial possibility" it is certainly likely
the same mistake has been made when courts have interpreted the language of
"substantial factor." After all, "substantial factor" and "substantial possibility" are only
one word apart, both ambiguous and practically interchangeable.
48 See Gerald W. Boston, Toxic Apportionment: A Causation and Risk Apportionment
Model, 25 ENVTL. L. 549, 561 (1995) (offering a liability apportionment scheme in lieu of
substantial factor test, under which defendants would be held liable only for their
established contribution to plaintiffs harm instead of the entire award). See generally
Calvin v. New York Medical Group, 286 A.D.2d 469 (App. Div. 2001) (suggesting that
court's substantial factor basis for defendant liability resulted in unfair and excessive
verdict for plaintiff). But see Danielle Conway-Jones, Factual Causation in Toxic Tort
Litigation: A Philosophical View of Proof and Certainty in Uncertain Disciplines, 35 U.
RICH. L. REV. 875, 889 (2002) (arguing substantial factor test is needed to adequately
compensate deserving plaintiffs who cannot prove but-for causation).
49 Wright, supra note 5, at 1097.
50 179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 1920).
51 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 cmt. j (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25,
2002) (crediting Anderson as first adopting substantial factor test); see also Bert Black,
General Tort Principles: Duty and Proximate Cause: Role of Foreseeability: A New
Metaphor for Clarifying the Difference Between Cause-in-Fact and Proximate Cause, 10
KAN. J. L. & PUB. POLY 159, n.1 (2000) (stating substantial factor test was developed to
address a perplexing fact pattern). But see Prosser & Keeton, supra note 10, at Supp., p.
45 (wondering if Jeremiah Smith foresaw all of the development on the substantial factor
test when he published Legal Cause In Actions Of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 103, which
proposed the substantial factor formulation).
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property. 52 The plaintiff attempted to show this fire smoldered
there until October 12, 1918 when it flared up and destroyed his
property shortly before one of the great fires sweeping through
Minnesota at the time did s0. 53 The defendant, however,
presented evidence showing that wind brought the great fires,
which were also burning west of the plaintiffs property, to the
plaintiffs premises and destroyed his property. 54 One of the
several charges the jury received was as follows:
If you find that bog fire was set by the defendant's engine
and that some greater fire swept over it before it reached the
plaintiffs land, then it will be for you to determine whether
that bog fire was a material or substantial factor in causing
plaintiffs damage. If it was defendant is liable. If it was not,
defendant is not liable. ... 55
Hence, the substantial factor test was first applied in the
circumstance where two fires converged, each of which was
sufficient to cause the plaintiffs injuries.56 A "but-for" instruction
is useless in this situation because "but-for" the fire allegedly
started by the defendants, the plaintiffs property still would
have been destroyed by the great fire; and likewise, "but-for" the
great fire the plaintiffs property still would have been ruined by
the defendant's fire.57 Therefore, under the "but-for" test we
reach the unacceptable result that neither fire is considered a
factual cause. 58 As such, solely using the substantial factor test
52 Anderson, 179 N.W. at 45-47 (restating the complaint).
53 See id. at 47 (summarizing the plaintiffs case in chief).
54 See id.
55 See id. at 434.
56 See id. (instructing the jury that if they found that the damage caused to the
plaintiff was caused by the combination of fires, it should then decide whether the fire set
by defendant was a "material or substantial factor in causing plaintiffs damage"); see also
McCool v. Davis, 197 N.W. 93, 96 (Minn. 1924) (Holt, J. dissenting) (arguing for the
application of substantial factor causation as formulated in Anderson); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 cmt. j (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2002) (explaining
substantial factor causation as originally formulated in Anderson ).
57 See Wright, supra note 5, at 1098 (asserting that if "but-for" test is used in this
situation, then "neither fire contributed to the destruction of the plaintiffs house ...
because, if either fire had been absent, the house would or might have been destroyed
anyway by the other fire"); see also Mavroudis v. Pittsburgh-Corning Corp., 935 P.2d 684,
688 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that in situations where conduct of either actor would
be sufficient to cause harm to the plaintiff, but-for causation would erroneously absolve
both actors). See generally PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 10, at § 268 (discussing the
substantial factor causation as a necessary alternative to but-for causation).
58 See Wright, supra note 5, at 1098 (calling this result "absurd"); see also Laines v.
State, 20 Fla. L. Weekly 2515 (Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the failure to allow
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should be limited to these situations in which "but-for" causation
does not work properly, i.e., where there are multiple causes of
an event and where each cause could, by itself, cause the harm. 59
III. NEW YORK'S ADOPTION OF THE SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST
However, New York has never limited the substantial factor
test to situations involving multiple sufficient causation sets.60
Judge Andrews, dissenting in Palsgraf,61 a case that did not deal
with multiple sufficient causative sets, issued the first opinion in
New York to use the terminology "substantial factor" for
describing proximate causation. 62 Similarly, in Morse v. Buffalo
Tank Corp.,63 Judge Lehman dissented using the substantial
factor language. 64 It was not until Dunham v. Canisteo65 that a
substantial factors to satisfy factual causation would lead to absurd results); Mavroudis,
935 P.2d at 688 (noting that but for causation would absolve two substantial-factor causes
when both qualify equally as cause in fact).
59 The reporter's notes to the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 cmt. j. concludes
that "with the sole exception of multiple sufficient causes" the substantial factor test
"provides nothing of use in determining' causation. The reporter's notes also recognize
that the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS "exacerbated" the confusion as to the correct
application of substantial factor. For an explanation on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS see infra Part IIIC. For a general synopsis on the proper use of the substantial
factor test see Robertson, supra note 10, at 1776-81.
60 See, e.g., Speller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 N.E.2d 252 (N.Y. 2003) (allowing
recovery in products liability where no other independently sufficient cause is claimed);
Merino v. New York City Transit Auth., 675 N.E.2d 1222, 1224 (N.Y. 1996) (upholding
verdict in which a single defendant was not held liable in absence of proof that
defendant's negligence was "substantial factor in causing [the] injury"); see also Palsgraf
v. Long I. R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting) (referring to
"substantial factors" as a measure of proximate cause).
61 162 N.E. at 104.
62 See id. at 103-06 to get a full sense of Judge Andrews' understanding of proximate
cause. Judge Andrews advocated that courts ask seven questions when determining
proximate cause. See id. All of the questions, including the one dealing with substantial
factor, went towards the attenuation of a cause. See id. The seven questions were:
[w]hether there was a natural and continuous sequence between cause and effect?
Was the one a substantial factor in producing the other? Was there a direct
connection between them, without too many intervening causes? Is the effect of cause
on result not too attenuated? Is the cause likely, in the usual judgment of mankind, to
produce the result? Or by the exercise of prudent foresight could the result be
foreseen? Is the result too remote from the cause, and here we consider remoteness in
time and space.
Id. at 104. See generally Johnson v. State, 334 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1975) where the
court followed the same formulation of proximate causation that was used in Palsgraf.
"The actor's conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if his conduct is a substantial
factor in bringing about the harm, and there is no rule if law relieving the actor from
liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in harm."
63 19 N.E.2d 981 (N.Y. 1939).
64 See id. at 986.
65 303 N.Y. 498 (1952).
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majority of the Court of Appeals used the "substantial factor"
language in an ordinary negligence claim.66
A. Dunham
The facts of Dunham were as follows: On March 3, 1949 - a
windy and bitterly cold day - the seventy-six year old plaintiff,
Charles Lee Dunham, began drinking a bottle of whisky at
approximately 4:00 in the afternoon. 67 At some point in the next
forty-five minutes he fell and seriously injured his hip. 68 The fire
commissioner discovered him on the fire station's floor at about
4:45 p.m. 69 After notifying the mayor, chief of police, and
superintendent of the streets that an individual was suffering
from the cold in the fire station, all of these men (not knowing of
Dunham's injured hip), carried the intoxicated, partially
unconscious, partially sleeping man to a cot in the village jail. 70
This action was taken not to arrest Dunham, but to keep him in a
warm place until he was able to go home. 71 At this point,
Dunham started complaining about his hip but declined to see a
doctor. At a later point during the night, however, Dunham,
asked for a doctor, while moaning in pain. 72 Dunham was finally
taken to a hospital in an ambulance at 9:00 a.m. on March 4th.73
Dunham died seven days later on March 11th.74
66 See id. at 506 (declining to hold as a matter of law that delay of treatment for
eighteen hours to seventy-six year old seriously injured man was not substantial factor in
causing his death).
67 See id. at 501 (discussing that prior to being dropped off in front of the post-office
with a bottle of whiskey, decedent had one drink then put bottle in his pocket).
68 See id. at 500-01 (stating that the only person who saw Mr. Dunham prior to his
fall testified that he saw decedent walking through on alley, staggering from one side to
the other, and that in his opinion Mr. Duncan was intoxicated).
69 See id. at 500 (noting that when fire commissioner asked him if he was hurt, the
answer was incoherent and he appeared to be suffering from the cold).
70 See id. (explaining that after decedent was carried to jail, he reported that he had
fallen in front of Red Front grocery store).
71 See id. at 501 (stating that mayor and police chief decided that no charge should be
placed against Mr. Dunham because he had done no harm, however, they would keep him
in jail where it was warm, as he was unable to go home).
72 See id. at 500-01 (finding that when asked by one of the witnesses, between 2:00
and 3:00 in the morning, after Mr. Dunham had asked for a doctor, and why he did not
get one, officer said, "it was no use at this time of the morning and it wouldn't do any good
if we did").
73 See id. at 501 (clarifying that police chief Stephens, according to his testimony,
became aware that decedent was injured about 9:00 in morning when he complained that
his leg hurt and noticed he was unable to get around).
74 See id. (quoting the death certificate signed by the attending physician that stated
that the disease of condition directly leading to the death was terminal bronchial
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One of the issues in the case was whether the negligence of the
town's officers in failing to procure medical attention for eighteen
hours was a proximate cause of Dunham's death.75 While the
expert, Dr. Otto K. Stewart, indicated "that the delay of eighteen
hours [contributed] to [Dunham's] death;" he further testified
that even if Dunham had received the best medical care at 4:45
p.m. on March 3rd, he very well may have died.76
The plaintiff, therefore, did not prove that failure to provide
immediate medical attention to Dunham was a condition
precedent to Dunham's death.77 Despite this lack of causative
proof, the Court refused to "say, as a matter of law, in view of the
doctor's testimony, that the delay in this case of eighteen
hours . . . was not a substantial factor for the jury to consider in
determining" causation. 78
B. Nallan
After Dunham, the substantial factor test was scarcely used in
the 1950's; 79 however, it started being used with increasing
consistency in the 1960's and 1970's.80 It was not until 1980, and
pneumonia and listing as the antecedent causes due to pneumonia were fractured right
hip and right elbow).
75 Outlining two questions presented:
First, was the Village of Canisteo... guilty of negligence in failing to
ascertain for some eighteen hours, while the decedent lay on a cot in the
village jail, that he had been injured and was in need of medical attention?
Second: If the Village of Canisteo and Stephens were negligent, was that
negligence the proximate cause of decedent's death?
See id. at 502.
76 See id. (satisfying the court's conscience in the sense that "the main point of his
testimony was that the delay of eighteen hours did contribute to this man's death").
77 By failing to meet this burden, the defendant was entitled to a favorable judgment
because the plaintiff, more likely than not, would have died anyway. See id. at 876. The
court, by holding that the defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs
injury, specifically on the grounds that the defendant contributed to the plaintiffs injury,
thereby changed the causation element of negligence. See id. The plaintiff did not need to
prove the defendant caused his injuries by substantially contributing to them; but, only
that the defendant contributed to his injuries. See id. In essence, the holding of the case is
that "contribution" and "substantial factor" are two separate ways of describing proximate
cause.
78 Dunham, 104 N.E.2d at 877.
79 See Firman v. Sacia, 184 N.Y.S.2d 945, 947 (App. Div. 1959) (rejecting application
of substantial factor test because it was unsupported by persuasive authority). But see,
e.g., Callwood v. Consolidated Edison Co., 142 N.Y.S.2d 290, 291 (App. Div. 1955)
(concluding that "the jury could reasonably infer that the dripping of the water from the
roof was a substantial factor in bringing about the ice condition on the sidewalk"); Rugg v.
New York, 131 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (App. Div. 1954) (applying the substantial factor test to
negligently caused injuries of motorist).
80 See Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628-29 (N.Y. 1973) (using the substantial
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the case of Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc.,8 1 that the Court of
Appeals explicitly adopted the substantial factor test for
determining proximate causation. 82
1. The Facts of Nallan
William Nallan was a member and officer of the International
Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees Union for several
years.83 In the months preceding September 30, 1969, Nallan
began investigating certain inconsistencies in union practices,
which he believed were evidence of internal union corruption.8 4
Due to his investigation two threats were made on his life.85
On September 30, 1969, at approximately 7:15 p.m., Nallan
arrived at New York City's Fisk building, for a regular union
business meeting. 86 As per routine, Nallan went to sign in at the
lobby desk. 87 Normally, an attendant signed individuals into the
building, but because the attendant was elsewhere performing
janitorial duties, 8 8 Nallan signed himself in.89
As Nallan was signing his name he heard a gunshot, which
was accompanied by a "burning sensation in his back."90 After
the shot was fired, more than one individual was seen running
out of the building.91 No one was ever arrested for the attempted
assassination, and Nallan was incapacitated requiring nursing
care for several subsequent months. 92
factor test for causation in strict products liability action); Jacobson v. Gimbel Bros., 296
N.E.2d 804, 804 (N.Y. 1973) (providing that liability is incurred if defendant's negligence
was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs injury); Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting
Co., 419 N.Y.S.2d 656, 658 (App. Div. 1979), aff'd, 414 N.E.2d 666 (N.Y. 1980) (concluding
that it is for the factfinder to decide if the negligence was a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm).
81 407 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1980).
82 See id. at 459 (stating that it was plaintiffs burden to show that defendants'
conduct was a substantial causative factor).
83 See id. at 454 (stating that Nallan had been an officer in Theatrical Local 52 of
that union).
84 See id. (noting that these investigations resulted in hiring of would-be assassin,
whose conduct precipitated present action).
85 See id. (stating that these incidents were reported to police, and thereafter, Nallan
no longer felt that his life was in serious jeopardy).
86 See id. (noting that the owner of the Fisk building is, in fact, a defendant in this
action).
87 See id. at 457.
88 See id.
89 See id. at 455.
90 See id.
91 See id.
92 See id.
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2. Issues and Analization
One question in the case was whether the lobby attendant's
absence was a proximate cause of Nallan's injury.93 Shockingly,
the Court concluded that a jury could find the absence of the
lobby attendant to be a proximate cause of Nallan's injuries. 94
The factual basis of the legal holding was expert testimony
indicating lobby officials 95 might deter criminal conduct. 96
While there was evidence showing a lobby attendant could
possibly deter some criminal conduct, the Court overlooked the
fact that there was no evidence tending to show that if the
attendant were present in the lobby then the attempted
assassination, probably, would not have occurred. 97 In fact,
93 See id. at 458.
94 See id. at 459.
95 The Court of Appeals clarified that the lobby official in this instance is merely an
employee of the building who is not accountable for security. See id. at 458. The Appellate
Division, Second Department, in Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 412 N.Y.S.2d 650, 652
(2d Dept. 1979), rev'd, 407 N.E.2d 451 [hereinafter App. Div. Nallan], expounded further
by noting the superintendent's testimony:
The building superintendent testified at the trial that the attendant, who was
approximately 60 years old at the time of the incident, was stationed in the lobby
after 6:30 p.m. for two reasons: (1) to clean the lobby and polish the elevators; and (2)
to take charge of the sign-in desk which was maintained in the lobby after 7:00 p.m.
The attendant's duties with regard to the sign-in desk were totally ministerial. He
was merely instructed to direct all late visitors to sign in and out of the building. The
avowed purpose of this procedure was to help locate the occupants of the building in
the event of a fire or other emergency.
App. Div. Nallan at 652.
96 See Nallan, 407 N.E.2d at 459.
97 The Court of Appeals and the Second Department disagreed over the plaintiffs
expert's testimony. The Court of Appeals stated:
Here, there was expert testimony in the record that the mere presence of an official
attendant, even if unarmed, would have had the effect of deterring criminal activity
in the building's lobby. This was so, according to the plaintiffs expert, whether the
crime in question was one of random violence or was a deliberate, planned
"assassination" attempt such as apparently occurred in this case. The clear
implication of the expert testimony was that a would-be assailant of any type would
be hesitant to act if he knew he was being watched by a representative of the
building's security staff. Contrary to the reasoning of the majority at the appellate
division, it would seem to us that the deterrent effect described by plaintiffs expert
would exist whether the lobby guard was a "trained observer" or, as here, was an
ordinary attendant with no special expertise in the area of building security, since
that fact would make no difference from the potential assailant's point of view.
Nallan, 407 N.E.2d at 459. The Second Department's analysis, which includes the actual
testimony, was as follows:
Finally, though the uncontradicted testimony of plaintiffs security expert was to the
effect that the presence of even an unarmed attendant in the lobby would have
discouraged the apparent assassination attempt, an examination of his trial
testimony reveals that this conclusion was predicated in large part on the
assumption that the person so stationed would be a trained observer whose primary
or sole function would be to maintain surveillance of the front door. Thus, it was
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because there were other individuals present in the lobby, it
seems highly unlikely that an unarmed lobby attendant or
doorman would have averted the attack. 98 As a result, there is no
way Nallan could prove that the absence of a lobby attendant
was a condition precedent to the firing of the assassin's bullet.99
Nevertheless, the Court allowed the action to commence and
noted that the plaintiffs burden of proof was limited to a showing
"that defendant's conduct was a substantial causative factor in
the sequence of events that led to Nallan's injury."10 0
As authority for using "substantial factor" for causation the
court cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 430.101 However,
stated: "Q. What then is needed, so to speak, to provide and to have the deterrent
effect that your are describing? A. The key deterrent effect results just from the
presence of a human being who is alert and is paying attention to watching people
come in and seeing to it that they do whatever it is that has to be done in regard to
signing in. They don't have to be in uniform, they don't have to be armed. Q. They
have to be maintaining observation and being on duty at the entranceway, the front
doors? A. Yes." Clearly, the attendant's job here was not of this nature, as he was
permitted (in fact, required) to leave the desk unattended for varying periods of time
in order to discharge his custodial duties.
App. Div. Nallan, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
98 See id. (adding that "the lobby at the time of the shooting was not totally
unoccupied, as plaintiffs associate, Mr Dobbins, was also present"); see also Nallan, 407
N.E.2d at 454-55 (noting that several individuals were seen running from the building
after the shots were fired).
99 The condition precedent aspect of the substantial factor test is found in the
Restatement (Second) Of Torts, which states: "the actor's negligent conduct is not a
substantial factor in bringing about harm to another if the harm would have been
sustained even if the actor had not been negligent." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
432(1) (1965). This issue is addressed by the Second Department when in holding that
there was not a breach of care on the defendants part, reasoned,
It has not been established in this case that the attendant's alleged prime
breach of care, i.e., his failing to lock the front door when leaving the lobby,
was an event of causal significance, since the plaintiff has been unable to
show that his assailant entered the building through the unlocked door
during the attendant's absence.
App. Div. Nallan, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 654. In coming to this conclusion, the Court cited
Bernal v. Pinkerton's Inc., 382 N.Y.S.2d 769 (App. Div. 1976), affd, 363 N.E.2d 362 (N.Y.
1977), where a gate to plaintiffs building was left unguarded by the guards employed by
Pinkerton Inc., through which an intruder entered and later caused injury. Id. In Bernal,
the court similarly reasoned "it cannot be said that the absence of the guard (who,
incidentally, was not required to be armed) from his station was the proximate cause of
the shooting" Id. at 770.
100 Nallan, 407 N.E.2d at 459.
101 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 (1965). The Court of Appeals also cited to
Prosser on Torts. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS WILLIAM L.
PROSSER § 42 (4th ed. 1971). However, Prosser & Keeton on Torts, specifically advises
against using "substantial factor." He explains:
Using [the substantial factor test] as a substitute for satisfying a "but for"
requirement seems likely to create confusion. This usage blends the substantive
requirement ("but for" or a substitute for "but for" causation) with the requirement of
proof ("preponderance of the evidence" or a substitute for that standard of proof).
Such a blending seems likely to distract from a clear focus upon the disputed policy
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it is sections 431 and 432 that examine substantial factor.102
Furthermore, a careful reading of the Restatement (Second)
shows that the Court misinterpreted the contours of how the
drafters intended the substantial factor test to be applied. 103
C. The Court of Appeals Misinterpreted the Restatement
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431, on its face, portrays
that an "actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to
another if his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about
the harm. ... "104 But, comment (a) to section 431 clarifies that in
order to be a legal cause of another's harm an actor's negligence
must be a necessary condition AND a substantial factor,105
issues upon which each of these judicial choices is based - one about the substantive
rule and the other about the burden of proof.
PROSSER & KEETON supra note 10, at § 41.
102 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965) states:
The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct is
a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law
relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has
resulted in the harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 (1965) reads:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the actor's negligent conduct is not a
substantial factor in bringing about harm to another if the harm would have been
sustained even if the actor had not been negligent. (2) If two forces are actively
operating, one because of the actor's negligence, the other not because of any
misconduct on his part, and each of itself is sufficient to bring about harm to
another, the actor's negligence may be found to be a substantial factor in bringing it
about.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
103 In holding that a jury could make out a prima facie case, the Court of Appeals
reasoned that "the jury in this case might well have inferred from the available evidence
that the absence of an attendant in the lobby at the moment plaintiff Nallan arrived was
a 'proximate' cause of Nallan's injury." Nallan, 407 N.E.2d at 460. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts outlines one set of criteria for substantial factor. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 431 (1965). Three different uses of the term "substantial factor" can
be identified in the second Restatement, adding to the confusion of the term. See generally
Robertson, supra note 10 at 1176. It is suggested that the only fully legitimate usage of
the term, the narrowest, is that which describes a cause-in-fact test used as a substitute
for the but-for test in cases where two acts caused an injury, and each one acting
independently would have caused the injury. See id. at 1776. In Nallan, it appears the
court used the second usage of the term identified in the Restatement, noted as "a looser
and potentially confusing usage, the substantial factor test is treated as more or less
interchangeable with the but-for test; in this usage courts seem to feel that it is
appropriate to shift to the substantial factor vocabulary whenever the but-for test is
proving difficult to work with for whatever reason." See id. A third type of usage deals
with the issue of duty, separate from cause-in-fact. See id.
104 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431(a) (1965).
105 See id. at cmt. a (stating that "[i]n order to be a legal cause of another's harm, it is
not enough that the harm would not have occurred had the actor not been negligent ....
The negligence must also be a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiffs harm");
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"except as stated in § 432(2)."106 Section 432(2) removes the
necessary condition requirement, allowing substantial factor to
be the sole test in proving causation, where "two forces are
actively operating to inflict harm, one because of the actor's
negligence, and the other not because of any misconduct on his
part, and each of itself is sufficient to bring about harm to
another."107
As a consequence, the Restatement (Second) does not support a
causation test based solely on "substantial factor," but requires
that both "substantial factor" and "but for" be used when
determining proximate causation.108 Only when there are
multiple sufficient causes does the Restatement (Second)
advocate exclusively using the substantial factor test. 109
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal's reliance on the Restatement
(Second) for precedent that all Nallan had to prove was that the
defendant's conduct "was a substantial causative factor in the
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(1) (including within the substantial
factor test the condition precedent requirement when stating "the actor's negligent
conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another if the harm would
have been sustained even if the actor had not been negligent").
106 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431, cmt. a.
107 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2); see Wright, supra note 5, at 1079
(explaining that necessary condition requirement is synonymous with but-for reasoning,
and insufficient for determining causation where there were simultaneous, independently
tortuous conditions as determined by Jeremiah Smith in developing substantial factor
reasoning); see also Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735,
1775 (1985) (noting "The test reflects a deeply rooted belief that a condition cannot be
cause of some event unless it is, in some sense, necessary for occurrence of the event").
108 See Barbara A. Spellman & Alexandra Kincannon, The Relation Between
Counterfactual ("But-For') And Causal Reasoning:Experimental Findings And
Implications Jurors'Decisions, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 255 n.54 (2001) (stating
that the "Restatement is somewhat unclear; it seems to require "but-for" casualty to
qualify as a substantial factor except in cases of multiple sufficient causes"); see also
Lawrence Joseph, The Causation Issue In Worker's Compensation Mental Disability
Cases: An Analysis, Solutions, And A Perspective, 36 VAND. L. REV. 263, 276 n.47 (1983)
(surmising that the Second Restatement's substantial factor requirement "includes the
,necessary antecedent' concept"). But see Karen L. Chadwick, "Causing" Enhanced
Injuries In Crashworthiness Cases, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1223, 1226-27 (1998)
(interpreting the Restatement (Second) to mean that a defendant's conduct is a
substantial factor if the defendant's conduct satisfies the "but-for" test); See generally
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, at 43 n.352 (describing three different interpretations
of phrase "substantial factor" and stating second use "proposes to deny liability for
insubstantial contributions, even when "but for" causal relation is established).
109 See Joseph, supra note 108 (quoting the Restatement (Second)); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS
§ 26, reporter's notes, cmt. j. (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002) (counseling against continued
use of substantial factor standard but "in the instance of multiple sufficient causes,
however, the substantial-factor test can be useful because it substitutes for the but-for
test in a situation in which the but-for test fails to accomplish what law demands").
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sequence of events that led to" his injuries was wrong.110 In fact,
because Nallan's situation did not involve multiple causes, like
Anderson,i"' then under the Restatement (Second) Nallan had to
prove that the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm and that the harm would not have
occurred had the lobby attendant been in the lobby."12
It is partially due to this type of misapplication of the Second
Restatement's substantial factor test that the Restatement
(Third) is markedly moving away from using any "substantial
factor" language.113  However, while the authors of the
Restatement (Third) do severely criticize substantial factor, they
do acknowledge that the sloppy language and configuration of the
Restatement (Second) contributed to confusion on how the
substantial factor test was intended to be applied.114
IV. WHAT DOES "SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR" MEAN?
Ask yourself, is 25 a substantial part of 100? Now ask yourself
what number should be considered a substantial part of 100?
These questions are important because juries are consistently
asked to determine if a defendant's negligent conduct rises to the
110 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431-432; Robert N. Strassfeld, If...:
Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 339, 354 n.73 (1992) (acknowledging
that the Restatement (Second) "adopts a substantial-factor formula, but it also requires
that an actor's conduct be a necessary cause of the harm to qualify as a substantial factor,
except in cases of two active forces operating concurrently where each is sufficient to
cause the harm").
111 Anderson v. Minneapolis, S. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 1920).
112 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431, cmt. a (stating that "[fin order to be
a legal cause of another's harm, it is not enough that the harm would not have occurred
had the actor not been negligent.. .the negligence must also be a substantial factor in
bringing about the plaintiffs harm"); Joseph, supra note 108 (citing the Restatement
(Second) for the proposition that "[tihe but-for test is necessary but not sufficient to prove
the existence of a "substantial factor" causal relation"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS § 26, reporter's notes, cmt. j (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002) (emphasizing that the
"essential requirement, recognized in both Torts Restatements, is that the party's tortious
conduct be a necessary condition... for the occurrence of the plaintiffs harm).
113 The Restatement Third notes that the substantial-factor test over time has
proven confusing in its application. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 reporter's
notes cmt. j. (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002); see also Wright, supra note 5, at 1073, which
notes that the Restatement (Second) suffers from structural flaws. See generally Ian
Gallacher, Hazardous Substance Litigation in Maryland: Theories of Recovery and Proof
of Causation, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 423, 443 (1997), which explains that the
critisizm of the "substantial factor" test as an insufficient standard to measure the
relevance or the sufficiency of evidence.
114 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 reporter's notes cmt. j. (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 2002).
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level of being "substantial."115 This amounts to asking juries to
define "substantiality."116
A. Defining the Word "Substantial"
At least one jury actually regretted not sending for a dictionary
after their misunderstanding of the word substantial resulted in
a plaintiff who was unjustly prohibited from collecting
damages.11 7 In Moisakis v. Allied Building Products Corp.,118 the
plaintiffs sought to recover damages for personal injuries.11 9
After the verdict dismissing the complaint was announced, and
the jurors were discharged, the plaintiffs' attorney and the jurors
conversed.120 The jurors claimed they were confused by the term
"substantial factor."121 The plaintiffs attorney brought the
matter before the judge.122 After a hearing, the judge, in a very
unorthodox procedure, required all of the jurors to return the
following week for questioning. 123
The Court asked the jurors if they were confused about
anything and one juror responded, "'[s]ubstantial' threw us off a
bit. We thought the question was substantially, meaning 100
115 See N.Y. PJI 2:70 (3d ed. 2003). See generally Hageman v. Santasiero, 716
N.Y.S.2d 485, 486 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting the N.Y. PJI 2:70 for the description of
proximate cause); Ohdan v. City of New York, 706 N.Y.S.2d 419, 422 (App. Div. 2000)
(explaining that in order to find that defendant's negligence was proximate cause of
plaintiff's harm, jury must determine if negligence was substantial factor in bringing
about harm as defined in Pattern Jury Instructions).
116 See N.Y. P.J.I. 2:70 (2003). See generally Acerra v. Trippardefla, 311 N.Y.S.2d 522,
525 (App. Div. 1970) (holding that definition of "substantial factor" found in Pattern Jury
Instructions meets requirements dictated by earlier case law); DiMaggio v. M. O'Connor
Contr. Co., 668 N.Y.S.2d 449, 450 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (overturning an inconsistent jury
verdict due to confusion regarding definitions of terms in Pattern Jury Instructions,
namely, proximate and substantial cause).
117 See Moisakis v. Allied Building Products Corp., 697 N.Y.S.2d 100, 104 (App. Div.
1999) (stating jurors claimed they were confused by term "substantial factor" on verdict
sheet and requested new sheet during deliberations citing an error had been made on first
sheet); see also John P. Cronan, Is Any of This Making Sense? Reflecting on Guilty Pleas to
Aid Criminal Juror Comprehension, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1187, 1201 (2002) (quoting
exchange between court and jurors in Moisakis). See generally Clarke v. Order of the
Sisters of St. Dominic 710 N.Y.S.2d 108, 109 (App. Div. 2000) (citing Moisakis and noting
new trial should be granted where jury encounters substantial confusion when rendering
verdict).
118 697 N.Y.S.2d 100 (App. Div. 1999).
119 See id. (stating that plaintiffs appealed from judgment of Kings County Supreme
Court dismissing their personal injury action).
120 See id. at 102 (indicating plaintiffs attorney wanted to discern why jury found the
way they did).
121 See id. at 101.
122 See id.
123 See id. at 101.
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percent, but it wasn't that way."124 The Court then asked all the
jurors if they felt the same way. The jurors responded with a
resounding "[y]es," and added that "[t]he word 'substantial' threw
us off."125 Juror Number Four ended the questioning session by
stating, "[t]he word 'substantial' threw us off. We were fighting
about the meaning of 'substantial.' We should have sent for a
dictionary."126
However, even if the jury had sent for a dictionary it probably
would not have clarified the meaning of "substantial" within the
jury instruction. After all, dictionaries give varying definitions of
the word "substantial."127 If the jury had sent for a dictionary
this is what they would have seen:
Substantial \ adj 1 A : consisting of, relating to, sharing the
nature of, or constituting substance : existing as or in
substance : MATERIAL B : not seeming or imaginary : not
illusive: REAL, TRUE C : being of moment : IMPORTANT,
ESSENTIAL 2 A : adequately or generously nourishing :
ABUNDANT, PLENTIFUL B: possessed of goods or an estate
: moderately wealthy : WELL-TO-DO; often : having a good
and well maintained income producing property C :
considerable in amount, value, or worth 3 A : having good
substance : firmly or stoutly constructed : STURDY, SOLID,
FIRM B : having a solid or firm foundation : soundly based :
carrying weight 4 A: being that specified to a large degree or
in the main B : of or relating to the main part of something
SYN see MASSIVE128
Hence, the "substantial factor" test could be any one of the
following: the "not-imaginary/real factor" test, the "important
factor" test, the "generous factor" test, the "solid factor" test, or
the "massive factor" test. 129
124 Id. at 104.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2280 (1993) (representing
one of the definitions of the "substantial" to be "not seeming or imaginary"); CAMBRIDGE
ADVANCED LEARNER'S DICTIONARY (2003), http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key =
79480&dict=CALD (indicating one of meanings of "substantial" to be "relating to main or
most important things to be considered"); Dictionary.com at http://dictionary.reference.
comsearch?q=substantial (stating meaning of "substantial" to include "true or real; not
imaginary").
128 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2280 (1993) at1389.
129 See id.; see also Greenleaf v. Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d 352, 361 (3d Cir. 1999)
(repeating the district court's jury instruction that "A substantial factor is a real actual
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B. Jury Interpretation of "Substantial"
As a result of varying understandings of "substantial", it is no
wonder that in Kovit v. Estate of Hallums,130 Judge Friedmann
made the following observation about how juries interpret the
meaning of the term "substantial factor":
Trial judges have recently been reporting that juries appear
to be reading "substantial factor" as a synonym for
percentage of fault. This has resulted in some peculiar
verdicts, which can only be explained as arising from the
juror's belief that causality, and therefore, fault, is
established only when a defendant's negligence has been
substantial, i.e., greater than 50%. Conversely, juries seem
to be concluding that a degree of negligence falling below
50% is not sufficiently substantial to constitute the
proximate cause of the mishap.131
These findings explain how the Pattern Jury Instructions
explain "substantial factor":
An act or omission is regarded as a cause of an injury if it
was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, that is,
if it had such an effect in producing the injury that
reasonable people would regard it as a cause of the injury.
There may be more than one cause of an injury, but to be
substantial, it cannot be slight or trivial. You may, however,
decide that a cause is substantial even if you assign a
relatively small percentage to it. 132
factor even though the result may be unusual, unforeseen, unforeseeable or unexpected
but it is not an imaginary or fanciful factor having no connection or only an insignificant
connection with the injury"); McDowell v. Davis, 448 P.2d 869, 871 (Ariz. 1968) (stating
that 'Webster's Third International Dictionary Unabridged, notes a number of varying
meanings for the word 'substantial' - among these it is defined as "not imaginary, not
illusive." Were we certain that it would be understood in this sense, or in the sense of
"insignificant", a litigant would have little cause to complain. However, Webster also
defines "substantial" as "abundant, plentiful and considerable in amount", at 2280.
Commonly, we speak in terms of a substantial amount as in a substantial meal or a
substantial income. If this meaning is attributed to the word, the instruction is palpably
erroneous as inducing the concept of largeness as opposed to smallness"). See generally
Battenfeld v. Gregory 247 N.J Super. 538, 547 (1991) (stating "substantial factor" cannot
be quantified in percentage terms).
130 690 N.Y.S.2d 82 (App. Div. 1999).
131 Id. at 85-86 (Friedmann J., dissenting) (explaining that there has been a change
in way courts have described term substantial factor to juries and how this may have
caused jury here to reach their verdict through faulty reasoning).
132 N.Y. PJI 2:70 (3d ed. 2001) (emphasis added); see also Stewart v. New York City
Health & Hosp. Corp., 616 N.Y.S.2d 499, 499 (App. Div. 1994) (holding cause only has to
be more than slight for damages to be sustained); Lewis v. AMTRAK, 675 N.Y.S.2d 504,
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This instruction attempts to clarify the meaning of "substantial
factor," but in the process creates a contradiction. If a proximate
cause cannot be slight or trivial, how can it be relatively small?
The adjectives small, slight and trivial are synonymous.133
Hence, these jury instructions offer little guidance and a lot of
hypocrisy on the meaning of substantial factor.
C. The "Subjective Factor" Test?
As a consequence, no clear legal standard exists on how to
interpret "substantial" and the determination of substantial
factor is based solely on the varying subjective lay-opinions of
jurors. 134 Therefore, in the interests of honesty and accuracy, the
"substantial factor" test should be renamed the "subjective
factor" test in order to more precisely describe the process of how
causation is analyzed. 135
V. NEW YORK'S USE OF SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR
Furthermore, New York has incorrectly "accepted the
proposition that, although the plaintiff cannot show the
defendant's tortious conduct was a but-for cause of harm by a
preponderance of the evidence, the plaintiff may still prevail by
showing that the tortious conduct was a substantial factor in
causing the harm."136 This is demonstrated by analyzing medical
malpractice cases where sympathetic plaintiffs are able to
recover from defendants who were negligent, but whose
negligence was not a condition precedent to the plaintiffs
506 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1998) (reciting that a negligent act can be a substantial factor in
bringing about an injury if it was even a slight cause of the injury).
133 See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2142, 2449-450 (1993)
(giving the definitions of each word and showing them to have similar meanings);
Dictionary.com, at www.dictionary.com (last visited October 10, 2003) (defining all three
words to have a similar meaning); Thesaurus.com, at www.thesaurus.research.com (last
visited October 10, 2003) (listing small, slight, and trivial as synonyms).
134 See Robertson, supra note 10, at 1779 (explaining how substantial factor test
appeals only to instinct); see also Kovit v. Estate of Hallums, 690 N.Y.S.2d 82, 82 (App.
Div. 1999) (stating it was not reasonable to find only one defendant had been substantial
factor of plaintiffs injury when both parties had been negligent); Moisakis v. Allied
Building Products Corp., 697 N.Y.S.2d 100, 104 (App. Div. 1999) (explaining that jury can
easily become confused as to practical meaning of substantial factor).
135 See supra Part IVA-B; see also supra note 46.
136 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26, cmt. j (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002)
(comparing different ways in which substantial factor test has been applied and showing
existence of inconsistent methods of application in many different jurisdictions).
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injuries.137
A. Cavlin
In Cavlin v. New York Medical Group,138 a married thirty-six
year old woman with a two-year-old son, went to the defendant,
Dr. Marvin Witt, and complained of a dry, hacking cough. 13 9 Dr.
Witt departed from the acceptable standard of medical conduct
by not getting her entire medical history and failing to take an X-
ray of her chest.140 The doctor diagnosed the woman with a post-
viral bronchial irritation, gave her a bronchodilator and asked
her to return in four weeks. 141
The woman, however, returned in four days complaining of the
same symptoms.142  The doctor provided a comparable
examination, but this time prescribed a narcotic cough syrup. 143
Nine days later, thirteen days after her original visit to Dr. Witt,
the woman's mother took her to a different doctor.144
The new doctor performed a chest X-ray, which disclosed a
mediastinal mass. 145 The mass was high-grade non-Hodgkin's
lymphoma.146 A few days later the woman died of complications
directly linked to the high-grade non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.147 A
large jury verdict was returned in the plaintiffs favor.148
137 See, e.g., Cavlin v. New York Medical Group, 730 N.Y.S.2d 337, 339 (App. Div.
2001) (stating plaintiffs only needed to show doctor's negligence resulted in probable
reduction in decedent's chances for survival); Stewart v. New York City Health & Hosp.
Corp., 616 N.Y.S.2d 499, 499 (App. Div. 1994) (stating patient did not have to prove that
hospital's negligence deprived her of ability to conceive and bear children naturally, only
that hospital's negligence was proximate cause of loss of her right fallopian tube and that
such negligence deprived her of substantial possibility of that ability); Kadyszewski v.
Ellis Hosp. Assoc., 595 N.Y.S.2d 841, 842 (App. Div. 1993) (determining to establish
prima facie case based solely on circumstantial evidence, it was enough that patient
showed facts and conditions from which negligence of hospital and causation of accident
could reasonably be inferred).
138 730 N.Y.S.2d 337 (App. Div. 2001).
139 See id. at 338.
140 See id.
141 See id.
142 See id. at 338 (indicating that the decedent's dry, hacking cough was neither
alleviated nor cured by the doctor's initial diagnosis).
143 See id. (demonstrating that the doctor failed to take a chest x-ray upon the
decedent's second visit to the office).
144 See id. at 338.
145 See id.
146 See id. (proving practicing good and accepted standards of medical care, which
includes taking chest x-ray, would have revealed mediastinal mass in decedent's chest).
147 See id.
148 The plaintiffs, the woman and her son, received a jury verdict for $1,437,775. See
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Despite the fact that the decedent was not going to survive the
condition, the court held that the negligence of the doctor in not
ordering an X-ray resulting in a thirteen-day delay in diagnosis
caused the woman's death.149 The court justified this result
under the rubric of substantial factor.150 The court stated that all
the plaintiff had to prove to establish that the defendants were
100% liable for all the damages was that it was probable that a
tiny bit of a diminution in the woman's chance of surviving
occurred. 151 In other words, if the chance of the woman surviving
was one percent, and after the doctor's negligence it was less
than one percent, the defendant is wholly the cause of the
woman's death and the plaintiff is entitled to a full recovery. 152
While no money in the world could return the child's mother, it
is hardly justice to conclude the doctor is responsible for the
mother's death. The high grade non-Hodgkin's lymphoma is what
id.
149 See id. at 338.
150 See id.
151 See id. (indicating plaintiff did not have to eliminate every other possible cause of
decedent's death and merely had to show that it was probable that some attenuation in
chance of survival had occurred).
152 This case should have been analyzed under the newly emerging doctrine called
"Loss of Chance to Survive," which has not been addressed directly in New York courts.
But see Birkbeck v. Central Brooklyn Medical Group, No. 4598/97, 2001 NY slip op.
40133U, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 368, at **1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 22, 2001), for a New York
case that addresses loss of chance to survive in an incorrect setting, i.e., the expert
testimony indicated that if the plaintiff was properly diagnosed he had a greater than
50% chance of surviving.
The "Loss of Chance to Survive" doctrine allows plaintiffs to recover from negligent
doctors for the decrease in a chance of surviving an injury or disease when more likely
than not, the plaintiffs were going to incur the harm anyway. For example, in Smith v.
Louisiana, the decedent went for a foot treatment when the doctors discovered cancer in
his chest. 676 So.2d 543 (La. 1996). The decedent's chance of survival at this diagnosis
ranged from one to twenty-five percent; however, the hospital failed to notify the decedent
for 15 months resulting in the decedent's chance of survival falling below one percent. See
id. at 546. The court held that although the plaintiffs could not show that "but-for" the
doctor's negligence the decedent would have survived, the plaintiffs were allowed to
recover for the value of the loss of the chance of surviving, which was a separate
compensable injury. See id. at 547; see also Jorgenson v. Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366 (S.D.
2000). The court recognized lost chance as a compensable injury where a plaintiff must
still prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's actions reduced her
chance of a better outcome, and therefore subjects the physician to liability only for the
extent that the physician contributed to the harm. See id. at 372.
Not all courts treat the diminution in the chance of survival as a separate compensable
injury; some courts allow recovery only a percentage basis for the lost chance following
Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving
Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981). The Second
Department, rather than ignoring the condition precedent requirement, should have
addressed a "Loss of Chance to Survive" action and allowed recovery while considering
the loss of chance to survive as a separate cause of action.
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caused the mother's death.153 Moreover, even if the doctor had
correctly performed a chest X-ray and identified the mass, the
mother probably would not have survived.154 The court awarded
an extremely sympathetic plaintiff the verdict because of the
unfair widespread notion that it is undesirable to allow doctors to
get away with committing any type of negligence. 155
B. Stewart
Stewart v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp.,156 is another
case where a doctor's negligence created liability even though the
doctor's negligence was not a condition precedent to the plaintiffs
injury.157 The defendant departed from accepted medical
standards by failing to diagnose the plaintiffs ectopic
pregnancy.158 This resulted in a ruptured right fallopian tube.159
153 See Cavlin, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 338 (highlighting results of decedent's chest X-Ray).
See generally Ferrari v. Lutheran Med. Ctr. 653 N.Y.S.2d 374, 375 (App. Div. 1997)
(noting decedent's death was 'directly and indirectly' caused by non-Hodgkin's
lymphoma); Flaugher v. Mercy Hosp. Corp., No. 92-CA2056, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3936
(Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 13, 1993) (stating lymphoma caused decedent's death).
154 See Davenport v. County of Nassau, 719 N.Y.S.2d 126, 127-28 (App. Div. 2001)
(dismissing plaintiffs complaint because plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact by
not rebutting the defense's medical expert affidavits that contended that the six-week
delay in the stage IV non-Hodgkins lymphoma diagnosis "did not affect the decedent's
prognosis, which would have been essentially the same even had the malignancy been
found six months earlier"); see also Flaugher v. Mercy Hosp. Corp. 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS
3936, at *3-5 (Ct. App. 1993) (recanting the testimony of Dr. Harris, the plaintiffs
expert's, who could not state to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that if the
decedent was diagnosed with the high grade non-Hodgkins lymphoma approximately 20
days earlier, upon a first visit, that the decedent would probably have lived). See generally
Bushman v. State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 915 F. Supp. 945, 947 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (defining
lymphoma as "a malignancy of the lymphoid cells in lymph nodes [that can be] originally
sitused in lymph nodes almost anywhere in the body," and explaining that lymphomas are
of two types, Hodgkins and non-Hodgkins, with non-Hodgkins being of three types - low,
intermittent, or high grade).
155 See Marshall B. Kapp, Medical Error Versus Malpractice, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 751, 755 (1997) (noting even physicians themselves, in their professionally
socialized 'culture of infallibility,' impose considerably higher standards of care on
themselves and their colleagues: namely, perfection); Sharon W. Murphy, Contributory
Negligence in Medical Malpractice: Are the Standards Changing to Reflect Society's
Growing Health Care Consumerism?, 17 DAYTON L. REV. 151, 151, 152 (1991) (stating
higher standards of care are put upon physicians than upon other tortfeasors, yet noting
courts are more willing to hold patients to higher degree of responsibility due to recent
heightened consumer awareness of health issues). See generally Twila Kleim, Physician's
for Professional Sports Teams: Health Care Under the Pressure of Economic and
Commercial Interests, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 196, 202 (1999) (advocating higher
standards of care for team physicians).
156 616 N.Y.S.2d 499 (App.Div. 1994).
157 See id. at 499 (finding defendant hospital liable for loss of child-rearing capacity
after undiagnosed ectopic pregnancy ruptured patient's right fallopian tube).
158 See id. (clarifying departure from acceptable medical practices deprived plaintiff
of substantial possibility of natural birth). See generally Martin A. Qwan et al., The
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The plaintiffs expert refused to quantify the plaintiffs chance
of getting pregnant if the doctor had not been negligent other
than to say that the chance was less than fifty percent, but the
defense expert calculated the possibility of her getting pregnant
at somewhere between five and ten percent.160
On appeal, the First Department reinstated the plaintiffs
verdict despite the fact that the plaintiff probably would never
have gotten pregnant.161 In an action for the loss of childbearing
capacity, the court made the astounding declaration that the
plaintiff did not have to prove that defendant's negligence was
the proximate cause of her inability to bear children. 162 "Rather,
plaintiff merely had to prove that defendant's negligence was the
proximate cause of the loss of plaintiffs right fallopian tube."163
If the jury concluded that the loss of a five to ten percent chance
of having a pregnancy was 'substantial' then the defendant is
liable.164
The reasoning of the First Department is faulty because the
doctor's negligence was not a condition precedent to the plaintiffs
inability to have children.165 More likely than not, the plaintiff
Diagnosis of Ectopic Pregnancy, AM FAM PHYSICIAN, Feb. 1985, at 201-07 (stating recent
developments in pregnancy testing have enabled physicians to make easy, accurate
diagnoses of ectopic pregnancies, and also stating ectopic pregnancies render large
percentage of survivors infertile); Lee Rothberg, The Frightening Costs of Ectopic
Pregnancy, RN, Jan. 1985, at 48 (discussing how to diagnose ectopic pregnancies).
159 See Stewart, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 499 (extrapolating said rupture resulted from
defendant's failure to diagnose). See generally Daniel Ing Hsu Wu & Alvin Langer, Ectopic
Pregnancy, AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN, Oct. 1982, at 161-66 (stating when tubal pregnancies are
diagnosed in young women who wish to remain fertile, techniques should further avoid
damage to fallopian tubes); Jane E. Brody, Ectopic Pregnancy: Increasing Hazard, N.Y.
TIMES, May 9, 1984, at 1 (stating early recognition and treatment of ectopic pregnancies
are essential due to eventual rupture).
160 See Stewart, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 499 (showing debate over plaintiff's chance of
successful uterine pregnancy). See generally Ana M. Schaper et al., Ectopic Pregnancy
Loss During Fertility Management, W. J. OF NURSING RESEARCH, Oct. 1996, at 503
(stating ectopic pregnancy threatens future fertility); Ectopic Pregnancy, HEALTHTIPS,
Sept. 1989, at 5 (stating with today's medical knowledge, ectopic pregnancies are far less
likely to result in death or infertility).
161 See Stewart, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
162 See id. (concluding plaintiff did not have to prove defendant's negligence deprived
her of the ability to conceive).
163 Id.
164 See id.
165 See id. The defendant's expert in the case stated that the plaintiffs chance of
naturally bearing a child prior to the doctor's negligence was around five to ten percent.
See id. As such, she was almost unable to naturally bear a child prior to the doctor's
negligence and therefore his negligence could not have been a condition precedent to her
inability to have children. See id.
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would never naturally bear a child.166 Additionally, the court
said that five percent can, as a matter of law, be a substantial
factor.167 If five percent can be a substantial factor, can 1 percent
or less also be a substantial factor?
C. Kadyszewski
In Kadyszewski v. Ellis Hosp. Assoc.,168 a 67 year old plaintiff
who was suffering from hip and thigh pain was admitted into the
defendant hospital under the care and treatment of her own
private doctor.169 On December 22, 1985, at roughly 4:15 a.m.,
the plaintiff needed to use the lavatory. 170 For thirty minutes she
attempted to call for help and at around 4:45 she went, on her
own, to the bathroom.171 The plaintiff got out of bed, grabbed her
walker, and proceeded to her final destination.172 As she
approached her room's door she collapsed, falling just inside the
doorway where she was later found by a nurse.173 She suffered a
fractured left hip. 174
Liability was alleged upon the hospital for failing to follow its
own rules, by not providing the plaintiff with topside rails on her
bed during the night.175 The Third Department reinstated the
plaintiffs cause of action, noting that if the failure to provide a
bed rail could constitute negligence it could also "have been a
substantial factor in bringing about the injury."176 The court
justified this result by dismissing the "but-for" test as a "self-
166 See id. (noting defendant's expert, who stated plaintiffs chance for naturally
bearing child before doctor's negligence was only five to ten percent).
167 See id. (stating jury verdict for plaintiff would be justified if jury found a five
percent loss in plaintiffs ability to naturally bear child and jury decided that this was
"substantial").
168 595 N.Y.S.2d 841 (App. Div. 1993).
169 See id. at 842 (stating plaintiff was suffering from left hip and thigh pain as well
as anxiety and depression).
170 See id. (noting plaintiff was medicated by hospital staff with Demoral, Visitril,
Motrin and Phenobarbital on the evening immediately preceding 'plaintiffs excursion to
bathroom).
171 See id. (discussing how plaintiff stated she called for assistance for half hour to
help her to bathroom before attempting to go by herself).
172 See id. at 843-44 (Levine, J., dissenting) (highlighting affidavit of plaintiff, which
stated the same).
173 See id. at 844 (Levine, J., dissenting) (noting how plaintiff completed act of getting
out of bed, proceeded almost out of the room before she fell).
174 See id. at 842.
175 See id. at 843 (stating since hospital violated its own rule, by not providing bed
rails, there is question of fact as to issue of their liability).
176 Id.
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serving declaration,"177 and glancing over the fact that side rails
were never intended to prevent this type of accident. 178
The bedrails were designed to prevent elderly patients from
inadvertently falling out of their beds and not to keep patients
confined in bed.179 Hence, even if a side rail were in place it
"would not have prevented plaintiff from leaving her bed to go to
the bathroom."180 Therefore, the absence of a bedrail was not "a"
or "the" cause of the plaintiffs injury. 181
D. Increased Insurance Costs
Cavlin, Stewart and Kadyszewski all demonstrate how the
"rich" doctor and "big bad" hospital have been held liable for
events that would have occurred with or without the hospital's
negligence.182 With decisions like these, it is no wonder medical
malpractice is in a current state of disarray.183 The proper way to
limit the increasing costs in the medical industry is not to cap
177 Id. (belittling the defendant's argument, which was "that bed rails, even if
properly placed, would not have prevented plaintiff from leaving the bed and that their
purpose is solely to prevent plaintiff from falling out of bed and not from leaving the bed.
. . [as] . . . a self-serving declaration by defendant in support of its position in this
lawsuit").
178 See id. at 844 (Levine, J., dissenting) (explaining bed rails will not prevent person
from getting out of bed, if they are physically capable of doing so).
179 See id. (Levine, J., dissenting) (pointing out "[o]ther mechanical restraints are
used to prevent patients from purposely getting out of bed").
180 Id. at 844.
181 See id. (emphasizing violation of hospital rule in not erecting bed rails "merely
furnished the condition or occasion for the occurrence of the accident").
182 See Cavlin v. New York Med. Group, 730 N.Y.S.2d 337, 338 (App. Div. 2001)
(considering a 13 day delay in diagnosis of non-Hodgkins lymphoma to be a proximate
cause of plaintiffs death even though a timelier diagnosis probably would not have saved
her life); Kadyszewski, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 843 (holding the jury could find that the hospital's
failure to place side rails on the plaintiffs bed was the proximate cause of plaintiffs fall
even though the fall would have occurred if the side rails were placed on the plaintiffs
bed); see also Stewart v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 616 N.Y.S.2d 499, 499 (App.
Div. 1994) (considering 5 percent to be a substantial factor).
183 See Impact of Litigation on Healthcare Access: Hearings on H.R. 4600 Before the
Subcomm. On Health, Comm. Of House Energy & Commerce (2002) (statement of Lauren
Townsend, Executive Director, Coalition for Consumer Justice); see also Mark F. Grady &
Paul C. Weiler, Better Medicine Causes More Lawsuits, and New Administrative Courts
Will Not Solve the Problem, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1068, 1069 (1992) (describing how
approximately one-half of all medical malpractice claims generate some payment); Scott
Forehand, Helping the Medicine Go Down: How a Spoonful of Mediation Can Alleviate the
Problems of Medical Malpractice Litigation, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 907, 908
(1999) (advocating current medical malpractice systems do not deter future physician
negligence). See generally M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CALIF. L.
REV. 247, 250 (2003) (commenting on national health policy disarray and chaos); Mark A.
Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 464 (2002) (noting "that the field of
health care law lacks cohesion").
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damages in lawsuits, but to require an increased burden on
plaintiffs to concentrate on the actual negligence of the doctors
and show that their negligence was in fact the cause of the
injury.184
VI. A PROPER JURY INSTRUCTION
As a consequence of the unjust results, confusion associated
with the substantial factor test, and the importance of the
condition precedent requirement, the author proposes a new jury
instruction. I have taken into account many scholarly works185
and the proposed jury instruction is the product of a desire for
simplification and clarity.i8 6
A. What Is Left Out of the Jury Instruction
In order for a jury instruction to be straightforward, the terms
"proximate cause," "legal cause," and substantial factor" must be
omitted. The problems with the term "proximate cause" are
twofold.187 First, the term implies that legal responsibility
184 See generally Bill Brubaker, Doctors' Insurance Soars, Then Disappears;
Physicians Blame Lawsuits, Awards, WASH. POST, May 10, 2003, at E01 (explaining
medical industry crisis); Caps May Not be Answer to Malpractice Mess, NEWSDAY (N.Y.),
Jan. 26, 2003, at A22 (suggesting there is evidence that proves capping lawsuits will not
solve financial problems in medical field such as insurance costs); Anne E. Kornblut, Bush
Wants Cap on Malpractice Awards Partisan Issue Touches '04 Presidential Race, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 16, 2003, at A3 (specifying why putting caps on medical malpractice damages
will not necessarily improve medical industry's financial problem).
185 See infra Part VI.A-B. See generally Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow,
Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instruction, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1306, 1307 (1979) (discussing difficulty of understanding jury
instructions); Walker, supra note 12, at 247 (clarifying that the "substantial factor" jury
instruction is vague and inadequate); Wright, supra note 5, at 1072 (promulgating the
need for clarification in the causation area of tort law).
186 The concept of simplifying jury instructions is certainly not new. See Charrow,
supra note 185, at 1335; see also THE JURY PROJECT: REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK 106-07 (Colleen McMahon, ed., 1994); J. Clark Kelso, Report: Final
Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System Improvement, 47 HASTINGS L.J.
1443, 1516 (1996). The jury instruction I propose is a model "but-for" causation jury
instruction and typically juries do not have problems with the "but-for" counterfactual
reasoning. See Spellman & Kincannon, supra note 108, at 264 (2001).
187 See generally Charles M. Cork, III, Annual Survey Of Georgia Law June 1, 2001 -
May 31, 2002: A Better Orientation For Jury Instructions, 54 MERCER L. REV 1, 53 (2002)
(describing Georgia proximate cause instruction as "mind-numbing"); Walter W. Steele &
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure To Communicate, 67 N.C.
L. REV. 77 (1988) (demonstrating empirically juror confusion with proximate cause
instructions); Kenneth Vinson, Proximate Cause Should Be Barred From Wandering
Outside Negligence Law, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 215 (1985) (advocating the elimination of
the proximate cause concept, calling it "common law leviathan").
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attaches to the cause of an event that is spatially and temporally
nearest.188 Second, a study has shown that almost one-quarter of
subjects interpreted the term "proximate cause" to mean
"approximate cause" or estimated cause.18 9
Similarly, the term "legal cause" is not included within the
proposed jury instruction because it has been shown, in the same
study, to misrepresent the law.190  One-quarter of those
interviewed contrasted the term 'legal cause" with illegal
cause. 191 As a result, legal cause is not an appropriate phrase in
188 See Wright, supra note 5, at 1074 (noting use of phrase "proximate cause"
erroneously implies proximate cause of harm must be one that is spatially or temporally
near, or even nearest, to harm); see also Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872, 877 (Cal.
1991) (observing "proximate" is an unfortunate word that places erroneous emphasis on
physical or mechanical closeness); Fraijo v. Hartland Hosp., 160 Cal. Rptr. 246, 255 (Ct.
App. 1971) (commenting on belief that "proximate" confuses juries by placing undue
emphasis on "nearness").
189 See Charrow, supra note 185, at 1353 (discussing study's results); see also
Mitchell, 819 P.2d at 877 (citing Charrow article); Robert L. Winslow, The Instruction
Ritual, HASTINGS L.J. 456, 468 (1962) (referring to frequent lay misinterpretation of
"proximate cause" to be "approximate cause").
190 See Charrow, supra note 185, at 1353 (noting that the use of "legal cause" causes
juror misrepresentation). See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, at 272-80
(examining historical confusion with causation terminology); Stapleton, supra note 5, at
957 (describing difficulties surrounding use of phrase "legal cause").
191 The Supreme Court of California recognized the poor construction in their jury
instruction:
We recognize that BAJI No. 3.76 is not perfectly phrased. The term 'legal cause"
may be confusing. As part of the psycholinguistic study referred to above the
experimenters rewrote BAJI No. 3.75 to include the term 'legal cause." The study
found that "25% of the subjects who heard 'legal cause' misinterpreted it as the
opposite of an 'illegal cause'. We would therefore recommend that the term 'legal
cause' not be used in jury instructions.
See Mitchell, 819 P.2d at 879; Charrow, supra note 185, at 1353. Professor Logan further
explains that:
Many a 1L has been frustrated trying to learn legal cause. There are various reasons
for this, not the least of which is the confusion caused by the tendency of judges (and
some scholars) to use the term as shorthand for two very different issues. The first
issue involves the plaintiffs obligation to prove that her injury was "caused" by
defendant's tortious conduct. This "actual cause" or "cause-in-fact" inquiry asks
whether the defendant's conduct was a necessary antecedent to the plaintiffs injury,
and involves the sufficiency of proof. Of course, public policy issues inhere in what
type of proof is acceptable, how much is needed, and so forth, but the core inquiry is
empirical in nature and involves the marshaling of brute facts to answer the
"but/for" question: would the plaintiffs injury have occurred absent defendant's
misconduct? Lack of proof of such a causal link precludes liability despit
blameworthy conduct. The second issue, legal cause, is more centrally a matter of
public policy. Even if the plaintiff can prove that the defendant's tortious conduct
was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiffs injury, the defendant may nevertheless be
excused from liability for some or all of the resulting injuries. The black letter of
legal cause asks whether the plaintiffs injury was sufficiently foreseeable at the
time of the defendant's misconduct to justify liability. But this, like most black letter
law, is deceptively simple.
David A. Logan, Masked Media: Judges, Juries, and the Law of Surreptitious
Newsgathering, 83 IOWA L. REV. 161, 210-11 (1997).
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jury instructions. 192 Finally, "substantial factor" has been left out
of the proposed jury instruction due to the jury confusion that it
causes. 193
B. The Instruction
The following instruction, which concludes this Note, is not to
be used where there are two sufficient causal sets. Moreover, the
instruction presumes that duty and breach (negligence) have
already been explained to the jury. And, as was stated in the
Introduction, the following jury charge is to be used in
conjunction with other charges on foreseeability, intervening and
superseding causes, etc... The following is the instruction:
I am now going to instruct you19 4 on how to determine if195 the
plaintiff, by the greater weight of the evidence,196 has proven
cause. The law defines cause in its own particular way. 197 The
192 See Charrow, supra note 185, at 1353; see also Mitchell, 819 P. 2d at 879
(suggesting that the term 'legal cause" should not be used in jury instructions); Stapleton,
supra note 5, at 957 (describing "legal cause" as incoherent amalgam of elements).
193 See supra Part IV; see also, e.g., Moisakis v. Allied Bldg. Prods. Corp., 697
N.Y.S.2d 100, 101 (1999) (describing juror confusion with the "substantial factor"
language). See generally Wright, supra note 5, at 1038 (discussing the misleading effect of
the "substantial factor rubric").
194 See Charrow, supra note 185, at 1342 (suggesting "I am now going to tell you" is a
good way to describe judge's duty to jury). See generally Steele & Thornburg, supra note
187 (describing the judge's role in instructing the jury on the law); Peter Tiersma, The
Rocky Road To Legal Reform: Improving The Language Of Jury Instructions, 66 BROOK.
L. REV. 1081, 1112 (2001) (beginning a proposed jury instruction with "I will now explain
the presumption of innocence").
195 See Charrow, supra note 185, at 1352 (explaining when not used as conditional,
unlike here, "if" confuses people). See generally Debra R. Cohen, Competent Legal Writing
- A Lawyer's Professional Responsibility, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 491, 495-96 (1996) (assessing
criticisms of legal writing, including convoluted sentences and tortuous phrasings, which
prevent effective communication of author's meaning); Hon. Gail Hagerty, Viewpoint:
Instructing the Jury? Watch Your Language!, 70 N. DAK. L. REV. 1007 (1994) (advising
jury instruction language should avoid complex, unorganized sentence structure).
196 The "greater weight of the evidence" is simpler and easier to understand than
"preponderance." This terminology is taken from the North Carolina Pattern Jury
Instructions for Civil Cases. See N.C. P.I. CIV. 102.10 (1994); see also THE JURY PROJECT,
supra note 186, at 107, which recommends that courts eschew jury instructions "couched
in outmoded and unfamiliar language or that are tautological." Charrow, supra note 185,
at 1336, also advises that difficult lexical terms should be replaced with simple synonyms
or phrases; while Steele & Thornburg, supra note 190, at 100, describes the inherent
generality of certain concepts of law that often defy description, including the phrase
"preponderance of the evidence."
197 See Charrow, supra note 185, at 1353 (recommending that this language be
utilized when instructing the jury on "proximate cause"); see also Mitchell v. Gonzales,
819 P.2d 872, 879 (Cal. 1991) (quoting Charrow); JOHN M. DINSE, RITCHIE E. BERGER AND
FREDERICK S. LANE III, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL: BOOK OF APPROVED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS (9th ed. 2003) (utilizing this language). See generally Steele & Thornburg,
supra note 187, at 100 (pointing out law students spend months learning causation while
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law considers a defendant's act or omission to be regarded as a198
cause of the plaintiffs injury if, and only if,199 the defendant's act
or omission had such an effect in producing the injury that
reasonable people would regard the defendant's negligence as a
cause of the injury.200 In other words, you must 201 use the
evidence presented in this case, your life experience, and your
common sense202 to consider if the plaintiff's harm20 3 would have
jurors are expected to comprehend complicated notions of causation based on limited -
and limiting - instructions).
198 It is proper to use the phrase "a cause" and not "the cause" to avoid the
implication that there can be only one cause. See Argentina v. Emery World Wide
Delivery Corp., 715 N.E.2d 495, 498 n.2 (N.Y. 1999), where the New York Court of
Appeals explains: "The certified question states 'the' proximate cause, which implies the
sole proximate cause of the injury. Since there may be more than one proximate cause of
an injury (see, Forte v. City of Albany, 279 NY 416, 422; PJI 2:71), we consider the
question to ask whether the vehicle was 'a' proximate cause of the injury." New York is
not the only jurisdiction to make such an observation. See, e.g., Stickley v. Chisolm, 765
A.2d 662, 666-67 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001); Balandzich v. Demeroto, 519 P.2d 994, 998
(Wash Ct. App. 1974); Alvarado v. Sersch, 662 N.W.2d 350, 358 n.5 (Wis. 2003) (Sykes, J.,
dissenting).
199 1 have taken this language from the NESS (necessary element of a sufficient set)
test. This test states "a condition contributed to some consequence if and only if it was
necessary for the sufficiency of a set of existing antecedent conditions that was sufficient
for the occurrence of the consequence." Wright, supra note 5, at 1102-03.
The judge delivering this jury instruction should emphasize this part of the instruction
with a change in the pitch of his or her voice in order to maximize the impact. See Bradley
Saxton, How Well Do Jurors Understand Jury Instructions? A Field Test Using Real
Juries And Real Trials In Wyoming, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 59 (1998), where it is
explained that:
Many of the attorneys who participated in the study commented that judges can
influence jurors' perceptions of the jury instructions by the manner in which they
read them, and that at least some of the judges read the instructions to jurors with
little inflection, emphasis or apparent enthusiasm. Common sense also suggest that
jurors will not be as likely to remain attentive if the judges instruct them in a
manner that seems monotonous or disinterested. Judges may thus help improve the
instruction process by "spicing up" their delivery of the instructions. Potential
innovations include: (1) reading with more varied tone and more frequent pauses for
emphasis; and (2) using a visual aid (e.g. a projected overhead image of the
instruction being read) to accompany the oral presentation of the instruction. Some
judges have also reported achieving good results by leaving the bench and reading
the instructions from the podium, in front of the jury box, to stimulate jury interest
and attentiveness.
Id. at 112-13.
200 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a; see also N.Y. PJI 2:70 (3d
ed.).
201 A linguistic construction that apparently enhances jurors' comprehension is the
use of "modal" verbs, specifically "must," "should," and "may," in phrases relating to the
jurors' duties." Charrow, supra note 189, at 1324.
202 The purpose of the substantial factor test is to allow juries "to draw conclusions
about causation from the evidence and from common sense." See John C. P. Goldberg &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Concern for Cause: A Comment on the Twersli-Sebok Plan for
Administering Negligent Marketing Claims Against Gun Manufacturers, 32 CONN. L. Rev.
1411, 1414 (2000). Hence, the substantial factor test's purpose is positive; the problem is
that it functions vaguely. It has been said that the "substantial factor instruction's 'heart'
might be in the right place, but its mind is elsewhere." Walker, supra note 12, at 301.
2004] NYS APPLICATION OF THE SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST 629
occurred even if the defendant acted properly.204 If you conclude
the plaintiff's harm205 would have happened anyway then you
must 206 find that the defendant's negligence is not a207 cause.
However, if the plaintiff's injury208 only occurred as a result of
the defendant's negligent conduct then you must 209 find that the
defendant's negligence is a cause.
Therefore, while I advocate for the death of the terminology "substantial factor," I believe
its spirit should live on.
203 The court must be meticulous at identifying the plaintiffs exact harm and
inserting it here. Identifying the plaintiffs injury is the first step in performing a "but-for"
analysis. See Robertson, supra note 10, at 1770. Although this is a seemingly simple step,
it must be done by the court. See id. at 1771. For example, in Stewart v. New York City
Health & Hosp. Corp., 616 N.Y.S.2d 499 (App.Div. 1994), the court needed to either
describe the plaintiff's injury as her inability to get pregnant or the loss of a chance of
getting pregnant. This description will have a major impact on the verdict because the
fact finder must decide whether the defendant caused that particular injury.
204 It is the court's job to correct the defendant's mistake. See Robertson, supra note
10, at 1769-74. Robertson explains, in a five-step process, the art of but-for causation. The
steps, in summary, are, (1) identifying the injury; (2) identifying the exact act or omission
that the defendant is charged with; (3) correcting only the defendant's wrongful conduct
in step 2 so that the defendant's conduct is lawful; (4) asking the question of whether the
plaintiffs injuries still would have occurred had the defendant behaved according to (3);
and (5) answering the question. The jury only answers the question. It is the court that
formulates everything else and when the court formulates the question in part (4) it goes
into the jury instruction here.
205 See supra note 203.
206 See supra note 201.
207 See supra note 198.
208 See supra note 203.
209 See supra note 201.

